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Accounting for Agent Heterogeneity in Market and Policy Analysis 
This book presents a multi-market framework of market and policy analysis that explicitly 
accounts for the empirically relevant heterogeneity in consumer preferences and producer 
characteristics. The explicit consideration of consumer and producer heterogeneity 
represents a significant departure from the representative consumer and producer that have 
been at the center of most of the literature on market and policy analysis, and enables the 
distributional impacts of changes in market conditions and policies to be fully identified. 
The framework is used to analyze the system-wide market and welfare impacts of a 
number of changes in market conditions (like changes in consumer preferences, costs and 
market structure) and policies (like subsidies and taxes) on one of the products in the 
system. Consistent with a priori expectations, the use of the framework unveils impacts 
masked by the conventional market and policy analysis. 
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Introduction 
This book discusses the importance of agent heterogeneity in the increasingly 
industrialized agri-food system and presents a novel, empirically relevant, integrated, 
multi-market framework of market and policy analysis that explicitly accounts for 
consumer and producer heterogeneity. In particular, this new analytical framework can 
account for heterogeneity in consumer preferences or/and incomes; heterogeneous 
producers (producers differing in their efficiency and net returns associated with the 
production of different crops due to differences in education, experience, location and 
quality of land, management skills, technology adopted etc.); imperfectly competitive 
input suppliers, processors or/and retailers; and links and interactions between the agri-
food supply channels of interest (i.e., markets of the reference/regulated product and its 
relevant substitute products and services).  
The new market and policy analysis framework is based on various models of 
heterogeneous agents (producers and/or consumers) and imperfectly competitive firms 
developed by the author and his colleagues and students over the past twenty years. 
These models have been used to analyze: the market and welfare effects of genetically 
modified products under different regulatory and labeling regimes (Giannakas and 
Fulton, 2002; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Giannakas and Yiannaka, 2004, 2006, 2008; 
Veyssiere and Giannakas, 2006; Plastina and Giannakas, 2007; Lassoued and Giannakas, 
2010; Giannakas, 2016); the market for organic products (Giannakas, 2002a; Giannakas 
and Yiannaka, 2006); the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Giannakas, 2002b); 
the effect of cooperatives in agricultural markets (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001, 2012, 
2013; Giannakas and Fulton, 2005; Drivas and Giannakas, 2009, 2010; Giannakas, 
Fulton and Sesmero, 2016); conservation compliance on highly erodible lands 
(Giannakas and Kaplan, 2005); the economic effects of purity standards in food labeling 
laws (Giannakas et al., 2011); consumer demand for quality-differentiated products 
(Giannakas, 2011); the market and welfare effects of country-of-origin-labeling (Plastina, 
Giannakas and Pick, 2011); the impact of fair trade on agricultural producers (Omidvar 
and Giannakas, 2015); the market and welfare effects of renewable portfolio standards in 
the U.S. electricity sector (Bhattacharya, Giannakas and Schoengold, 2017); the market 
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and welfare effects of food nanotechnology innovations (Tran, Yiannaka and Giannakas, 
2018) and the economic impacts of mandatory labeling of products of food 
nanotechnology (Tran, Yiannaka and Giannakas, 2019); the economic effects of, and 
optimal policy response to food fraud in the form of food adulteration and mislabeling 
(Meerza, Giannakas and Yiannaka, 2018, 2019); the economic impacts and optimal 
design of crop insurance (Mavroutsikos, Giannakas and Walters, 2018); and the effect of 
innovation and policy on food security (Giannakas and Yiannaka, 2018).  
The research presented here integrates this accumulated knowledge and 
experience into an empirically relevant market and policy analysis framework that can be 
adapted to encompass all relevant segments/participants in the agri-food system. The 
development of this new framework of analysis was funded by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Policy Research Centers Program under award number 2012-70002-19387. 
Once the general framework of analysis has been developed, it is used to analyze 
the market and welfare impacts of changes in market conditions (like consumer preferences, 
costs and market structure) and standard, textbook policy mechanisms like input and output 
subsidies and taxes. In addition to deriving the effects of these market changes and policies 
on the different consumer and producer groups (and comparing the results to those of the 
traditional analysis), the analysis of these market changes and policy mechanisms 
demonstrates how the proposed framework can be utilized in market and policy analysis. 
 
Novelty, Relevance & Significance 
The explicit consideration of consumer and producer heterogeneity in market and policy 
research represents a significant departure from the “representative consumer” and 
“representative producer” that have been the foundation of most of the literature on 
market and policy analysis, while accounting for the presence of imperfect competition in 
the agri-food system represents a departure from the perfectly competitive market 
structures analyzed in many market and policy studies. Indeed, through its reliance on the 
conventional models of representative consumers and producers, traditional market and 
policy analysis has (implicitly or explicitly) assumed a homogeneous response to, and 
impacts from, various changes and policies affecting the agri-food marketing system.  
- 4 - 
 
 
 
It is well-known, however, that both consumers and producers are highly 
heterogeneous groups and that this heterogeneity is expressed through highly diverse 
demands for and supplies of products, programs, services, and policies. In this context, 
the traditional focus on representative consumers and/or producers prevents both the 
determination of the effects of different market changes and policies on different 
consumer and producer groups as well as the understanding of the widely different 
positions held by seemingly similar groups in policy negotiations.  
These assumptions of the traditional market and policy analysis are becoming 
particularly questionable in the contemporary agri-food system. Retailing, processing and 
key input supply sectors (e.g., seeds and chemicals) are now highly concentrated, while 
there has been a recognition that consumers and producers are anything but homogenous, 
particularly when it comes to the consumption and production of an increasing range of 
product qualities and types. In addition, the presence of differentiated products leads to 
departures from perfect competition, thus linking concentration to product differentiation 
(Sexton, 2013).  
The presence of oligopoly and oligopsony power has been shown to lead to 
significant efficiency losses and distributional impacts between agribusiness firms, 
producers and consumers (Sexton, 2000). The introduction of heterogeneous consumers 
and producers generates differentiated demands for and supplies of products and services, 
which, in turn, affect the response to policy changes and the impact of the response on 
individual welfare. 
While a large number of recent market studies of various segments of the agri-
food system have moved past the representative consumer and producer frameworks and 
have incorporated consumer (mainly) and producer heterogeneity in their analyses, the 
relevant adjustment rate in policy studies has been significantly lower. This is happening 
at the same time that the policy debate includes protests against the diverse impacts of 
policies on producers such as the concentration of most of agricultural support to a small 
number of large farms. Consumers also seem to have widely differing views on the role 
of new technology (e.g., biotechnology, nanotechnology) in food production as well as 
the optimal regulatory response to products of these technologies. 
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Recognizing 1) the increasing industrialization of the agri-food system 
(characterized, at least in part, by a move from commodities to differentiated products 
and an increased vertical coordination from “lab to fork” (Boehlje, 1996)); 2) that this 
fundamental transformation of the agri-food system makes the consumer and producer 
differentiating attributes and idiosyncrasies critical in understanding its increasingly 
complex workings; and 3) that such an understanding is imperative both for the analysis 
of the economic impacts of market changes and policies and the design of mechanisms 
that can achieve certain policy objectives in a more efficient manner, the proposed 
framework of analysis allows market and policy research to explicitly account for critical 
elements of this transformed environment.  
As mentioned earlier, the explicit consideration of consumer and producer 
heterogeneity represents a significant departure from the “representative consumer” and 
“representative producer” that have been at the epicenter of most of the literature on 
market and policy analysis, while accounting for the presence of imperfect competition in 
the agri-food system represents a departure from the perfectly competitive markets 
analyzed in many market and policy studies. In addition, the focus on the links and 
interactions between the reference/regulated products and their close but imperfect 
substitutes (the number of which has been growing rapidly in the increasingly 
industrialized agri-food system; see Giannakas (2011)) is a departure from both the 
general equilibrium and the partial equilibrium approaches employed extensively in 
policy analysis. Specifically, our framework is neither a general equilibrium nor a partial 
equilibrium in the sense that it does not focus either on the whole economy or a single 
market. Instead, it is a flexible, multi-market framework that can be adapted to analyze 
any number of supply channels of interest – i.e., any number of products along with their 
substitute products and services.  
 While equilibrium models and equilibrium displacement models also recognize 
the interdependence of markets and are able to capture how a policy intervention in one 
market affects both this market and other markets, these models have often assumed 
perfectly competitive market structures (although the impact of market power has also 
been examined – see, for instance, Holloway (1991) and Alston et al. (1997)) and have 
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typically examined homogeneous products demanded and supplied by representative 
consumers and representative producers (for an extensive review of this literature, see 
Wohlgenant (2011)). 
In addition to enhancing the empirical relevance of market and policy analysis by 
allowing the research to account for key elements of the increasingly industrialized agri-
food system, the explicit consideration of consumer and producer heterogeneity enables 
the analysis to disaggregate these interest groups and determine the effects of different 
market changes and policies on different consumers and producers (e.g., consumers of 
different products, low- versus high-income consumers, more- versus less-efficient 
producers, etc.). Better measures (and understanding) of the market and welfare effects of 
a policy can lead to improved policy design, enhanced efficiency, increased effectiveness, 
and reduced policy failures. 
 
Book Structure 
The rest of this book is structured as follows. Section I focuses on the development of the 
new multi-market framework of analysis. The decisions and welfare of heterogeneous 
consumers are considered first, followed by the decisions and welfare of heterogeneous 
producers, and imperfectly competitive middlemen and input suppliers. This section 
concludes with alternative considerations, market arrangements and organizational forms 
that can be analyzed with proper adaptations of our framework of analysis. Section II 
utilizes our integrated methodological framework to analyze the system-wide market and 
welfare impacts of changes in (a) consumer preferences, (b) market power of middlemen 
and input suppliers, and (c) the cost structure on input suppliers. This section concludes 
with a discussion of alternative market considerations and firm strategies that can be 
(and, many, have been) analyzed using this framework. Following a similar structure, 
Section III utilizes our integrated framework to analyze (a) a textbook output 
(producer/consumer) subsidy under perfect competition, (b) demand-affecting policies 
(like a consumption tax) under imperfect competition, and (c) supply-affecting policies 
(like an input subsidy) under imperfect competition. This section concludes with a 
discussion of other important food and environmental policies that can be (and have 
- 7 - 
 
 
 
been) analyzed using our market and policy analysis framework. The sections focusing 
on the different market changes and policies have a similar structure and level of 
explanation to ensure that (i) each analysis can stand alone and (ii) the interested reader 
can easily identify the similarities and differences in the market and welfare impacts of 
these changes in the economic environment. The empirical implementation of our 
framework is also discussed before the final section summarizes and concludes this book.   
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I.   Framework of Analysis 
This section focuses on the development of our integrated, multi-market framework of 
market and policy analysis. Figure I.1. depicts a typical supply chain from lab to fork. 
Agricultural producers produce the farm product using inputs provided by the input 
suppliers. The farm product is then procured by middlemen (food processors and 
retailers) who produce the food product and sell it to consumers.  
 
 
Figure I.1.  A Typical Supply Chain 
 
The framework considers the vertical relationships in this supply chain as well as the 
horizontal and diagonal relationships between the various segments of this supply chain 
and the supply chain of its substitute products, i.e., products that are linked in the demand 
and supply stages of the different marketing systems.1 We begin by considering the 
consumption decisions of heterogeneous consumers and derive the demands for the 
different products and theory-consistent measures of the welfare of the different consumers 
involved. This part also compares the consumer welfare measures derived using our 
framework with the standard consumer surplus measures derived in the literature. Once the 
consumer problem has been analyzed, we move to the analysis of the production decisions 
of heterogeneous agricultural producers, the derivation of farm product supplies and input 
                                                          
1 The term “diagonally related markets” refers to markets at different stages of different supply 
channels. An example of diagonally related markets would be the final consumer market for a 
product and the producer (or input) market for its substitute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumers 
Middlemen 
Producers 
Input Suppliers 
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demands, and the welfare of these producers. Similar to the consumer case, the welfare 
measures derived using our framework are compared to the standard producer surplus 
measures derived in the literature. Once the different demand and supply schedules have 
been derived, we consider the optimization problems of imperfectly competitive 
middlemen and input suppliers in the relevant supply channels and derive the system-wide 
equilibrium conditions. The advantages of utilizing this framework for the analysis of the 
welfare impacts of market and policy changes are discussed before the final part of this 
section presents alternative relevant formulations of the consumer, producer, middlemen 
and input supplier models that can be accommodated by our framework of analysis.  
     
I.1. Consumers 
Consumers are assumed to have a choice between three products: the reference/regulated 
product (i.e., the product in the supply chain of which market changes are studied in 
Section II and which is subsidized and taxed in Section III below) and its lower- and 
higher-quality substitutes. Consumers buy, at most, one unit of their chosen product and 
differ in the strength of their preference for the different food products. Let [0,1] be 
the attribute that differentiates consumers with greater s corresponding to stronger 
consumer preference for quality. Assuming that the unit consumption of the products in 
question represents a small share of the total consumer budget, the consumer utility 
function can be written as: 
  crgrg pUU   if a unit of the reference product is consumed 
  c
hshs
pUU   if a unit of the high quality substitute is consumed 
 UU ls     if a unit of the low quality substitute is consumed    (I.1) 
where U is a base level of utility associated with the consumption of these products; 
c
rgp  
and chsp  are the consumer prices of the reference product (rg) and its high quality 
substitute (hs), respectively;  reflects differences in the consumer valuation of the 
differentiating attribute of these products (i.e., quality); and  and  are preference 
parameters/utility enhancement factors associated with the consumption of the reference 
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product and its high quality substitute, respectively. To capture the quality difference 
between the hs and the rg products, it is assumed that  > with (-) capturing the 
valuation of the quality differential between these products by the consumer with 
differentiating attribute  – the greater is , the greater the consumer valuation of the 
perceived quality difference between the two products.2 
In addition to reflecting the utility associated with the low quality substitute 
product, Uls can also be viewed as reflecting a reservation level of utility – i.e., the utility 
consumers would receive if they chose to consume neither the reference product nor its 
high quality substitute. For simplicity (and without loss of generality), in what follows, 
our analysis treats Uls as the consumer reservation level of utility and focuses on the 
markets for the reference product and its high quality substitute. In addition to saving on 
notation, such a formulation enables us to account for consumer entry and/or exit from 
the markets under consideration. 
In this context, the consumer choice/consumption decision depends on the 
relationship between Urg, Uhs  and Uls. More specifically, the consumer with 
differentiating attribute: 


c
rg
lsrglsls
p
UU :         (I.2) 
is indifferent between consuming a unit of the reference product and not consuming any 
of these products – the utility associated with these alternatives is the same. Similarly, the 
consumer with differentiating characteristic:  





c
rg
c
hs
rghsrgrg
pp
UU:      (I.3) 
is indifferent between consuming a unit of the reference product and a unit of its higher 
quality substitute. Consumers with a strong preference for quality (i.e., consumers with  
( ,1]rg  ) prefer the higher quality substitute, consumers with ( , )ls rg    prefer the 
                                                          
2 For the relationship of our model with the classical models of vertical product differentiation and 
its suitability for studies of the agri-food marketing system, see Giannakas (2011).  
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reference product, while consumers with [0, ]ls   consume neither of these two 
products. Figure I.2 graphs rgU , hsU  and lsU  and illustrates the consumer decisions in 
consumer utility space. 
 
 
Figure I.2.  Consumption Decisions and Welfare 
 
When consumers are uniformly distributed between the polar values of ,3 1 rg  
determines the share of the high quality substitute product in total consumption, hsx . The 
consumption share of the reference product, rgx , is given by .rg ls   Normalizing the 
mass of consumers at unity, hsx and rgx  give the consumer demands for the high quality 
substitute and the reference products, respectively. Mathematically, hsx  and rgx  can be 
written as:    





c
rg
c
hs
hs
pp
x         (I.4) 
 




c
rg
c
hs
rg
pp
x        (I.5) 
                                                          
3 The implications of relaxing this assumption to allow for a concentration of consumers at the 
ends of the spectrum (i.e., zero and one) are straight forward and are discussed throughout this 
section. 
rg
c
hspU 
0 1 
hsx
Differentiating Consumer Attribute ()

c
rgpU 
rgx

Consumer Utility 
U
ls
lsx
rgB
hsB
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From equations (I.4) and (I.5) it follows that the demand for the high quality substitute 
(reference) product falls with an increase in its price and/or a decrease (increase) in the 
strength of the consumer preference for quality,4 and rises as the price of the reference 
(high quality substitute) product increases. If 
c
rgp  were greater than 
c
hsp , the utility curve 
rgU  would lie underneath hsU  for all consumers (), the reference product would be 
driven out of the market, and the demand for the high quality substitute would be:  



c
hs
lshs
p
x

 '1    where lshsls UU :
'    (I.6) 
On the other hand, if the price premium of the high quality substitute, 
c c
hs rgp p , 
exceeded the valuation of the quality difference between the two products for all 
consumers, μ-λ, the utility curve hsU  would lie underneath rgU  for all consumers, and it 
would be the high quality substitute priced out of the market. The demand for the 
reference product would then be:  



c
rg
lsrg
p
x

1         (I.7) 
Figure I.3 graphs the inverse demand curves for the reference product and its 
high quality substitute (shown as rgD and hsD , respectively) in the familiar price-quantity 
space when the prices and preference parameters are such that the two products co-exist 
in the market. The inverse demand curves (derived from equations (I.4) and (I.5)) are 
given by: 
  rgchscrg xpp 

        (I.8) 
 
hs
c
rg
c
hs
xpp         (I.9) 
and illustrate the interdependence between the markets for the two products – the price 
and preference parameters associated with the consumption of a product are direct 
arguments in the demand for its substitute.   
                                                          
4 An increase in the consumer preference for quality can occur due to an increase in μ and/or a 
reduction in λ. 
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Figure I.3.  Consumer Demands for the Reference (rg) and High Quality Substitute (hs)  
       Products 
 
Before concluding this section, it should be pointed out that, in addition to enabling the 
derivation of the market shares and consumer demands for the different products, the 
heterogeneous consumer framework of analysis outlined above also enables us to derive 
theory-consistent measures of consumer welfare. Since the expressions in equation (I.1) 
are direct measures of the utility associated with the consumption of the different 
products for the consumer with differentiating attribute α, the area under the effective 
(bold dashed kinked) utility curve in Figure I.2 shows the welfare of the different 
consumers. The welfare of consumers of the regulated product ( *rgU ), the high quality 
substitute ( *hsU ), and those staying out of the markets for these products (
*
lsU ), is given by 
   
* 21
2 2
rg
ls
c c c c
hs rg hs rg
rg rg rg rg
p p p p
U U d Ux x U


   
 
    
  
     
   

  (I.10)
 
1
* 21( )
2
( ) (2 ) ( )
2( )
rg
hs hs rg hs hs
c c c c
hs rg hs rg
U U d U x x x
p p p p
U

  
       
   
    
       
  
   

  
 (I.11)
 
*
0
ls c
rg
ls ls ls
Up
U U d U

 

          (I.12) 
0 
panel a: rg Mkt
 -
0 
panel b: hs Mkt
 crgp
hsp
c
hsp
rgD
rgp
hsxrgx



 )( 
hsD
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Aggregate consumer welfare is given by the summation of *rgU , 
*
hsU  and 
*
lsU . Obviously, 
if the distribution of consumers is not uniform, but is, for instance, skewed to the left (i.e., 
the probability mass is shifted towards one), the greater is the number of consumers with 
relatively strong preference for quality, the greater is the market share of the high quality 
substitute product, and the greater the welfare of the consumers of this product, *hsU .  
Finally, it is important to note that there is a direct correspondence between the 
consumer welfare measures presented above and the surplus measures derived from the 
consumer demand schedules presented in Figure I.3. Specifically, while the *rgU  and 
*
hsU  
in equations (I.10) and (I.11) measure the total welfare of consumers of the regulated 
product and its high quality substitute (i.e., the areas under the rgU  and hsU  curves in 
Figure I.2), the surplus measures derived from the demand curves in Figure I.3 
correspond to the benefit received from the consumption of the two goods relative to 
their next best alternative. Thus, for given prices chsp  and 
c
rgp , the consumer surplus 
measures rgCS and hsCS  that could be calculated in Figure I.3 are equal to areas rgB   
and hsB in Figure I.2, where  
   
 
 
'
'
2
1 1
2 2
rgls
ls ls
c c
hs rgc c
rg rg rg rg hs hs rg rg
p p
CS B U U d U U d p p x

 
 
 
   
 
        
 
    
and  
)(
)(
2
1
)(
2
1
)(
21



 

 
c
hs
c
rg
hs
c
hs
c
rgrghshshs
pp
xppdUUBCS
rg
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I.2. Producers 
Our framework also assumes that producers differ in the net returns they receive from 
different crops due to differences in such things as age, education, experience, 
management skills, location and quality of land, and technology adopted. Let A[0,1] be 
the attribute that differentiates producers, with higher values of A corresponding to less 
efficient producers. Producers, in our case, have the choice between the reference 
product, its higher-quality substitute and an alternative crop, and their net return function 
is given by: 
f
rg rg rgNR p w A      if a unit of reference product is produced 
f
hs hs hsNR p w A        if a unit of high quality substitute is produced 
 0aNR           if a unit of alternative crop is produced  (I.13) 
where fip  is the producer price of product i (i = rg, hs); iw  are the production costs that 
are outside the control of the farmer; A is the differentiating producer attribute 
(efficiency, in our case); and  and  are cost enhancement factors associated with the 
production of the reference product and its high quality substitute, respectively. To ensure 
a non-negative relationship between quality and costs of production, we assume that  >  
with (- )A capturing the difference in the costs of producing the two products for the 
producer with differentiating attribute A. To save on notation, the returns to the 
production of the alternative crop have been normalized to zero.       
In this context, the producer decision is determined by the relationship between 
rgNR , hsNR  and aNR . More specifically, the producer with differentiating attribute: 
( ) ( )
:
f f
hs hs rg rg
hs hs rg hs
p w p w
A NR NR A
 
  
  

   (I.14) 
is indifferent between producing a unit of the reference product and its higher quality 
substitute – the net returns associated with the production of these crops are the same. 
Similarly, the producer with differentiating characteristic:  
: 0
f
rg rg
rg rg rg
p w
A NR A


        (I.15) 
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is indifferent between producing a unit of the reference product and a unit of the 
alternative crop. More efficient producers (i.e., producers with [0, ))hsA A  prefer to 
produce the higher quality substitute, producers with ( , )hs rgA A A  prefer to produce the 
reference crop, while producers with ( ,1]rgA A  produce the alternative crop. Figure I.4 
graphs rgNR , hsNR  and aNR  and illustrates the producer decisions in the net returns 
space.  
 
 
Figure I.4.  Producer Decisions and Welfare 
 
When producers are uniformly distributed between the polar values of A, hsA  determines 
the share of the high quality substitute crop in total production, hsx .
5 The production share 
of the reference product, ,rgx is given by rg hsA A . Normalizing the mass of producers at 
unity, hsx  and rgx  give the supplies of the high quality substitute and the reference crops, 
respectively. Mathematically, hsx  and rgx can be written as:    
 


)()( rg
f
rghs
f
hs
hs
wpwp
x      (I.16) 
                                                          
5 The implications of relaxing this assumption to allow for a concentration of producers at the ends 
of the spectrum (i.e., zero and one) are straight forward and are discussed throughout this section. 
rgA
hs
f
hs wp 
0 1 
Differentiating Producer Attribute (A)
γ
rgx
δ
Net Returns 
hsA
hsx
rg
f
rg wp 
hsG
rgG
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)()(





hs
f
hsrg
f
rg
rg
wpwp
x      (I.17) 
The greater is the farm price of a product and/or the lower is the cost associated with its 
production, the greater is its production share (and quantity supplied). If hs
f
hs wp   were 
smaller than rg
f
rg wp  , the net returns curve hsNR  would lie underneath rgNR  for all 
producers (A), the high quality substitute would be driven out of the market and the 
supply of the regulated product would be:  

rg
f
rg
rgrg
wp
Ax

            
On the other hand, if the difference hs
f
hs wp   exceeded 
 )( rg
f
rg wp 
, the net returns 
curve rgNR  would lie underneath hsNR for all producers, and the regulated product would 
be priced out of the market. The supply of the high quality substitute would then be:  

hs
f
hs
hshs
wp
Ax

 '    where ' : 0hs hsA NR     
Figure I.5 graphs the inverse supply curves for the reference and high quality 
substitute crops (shown as rgS  and hsS , respectively) in the familiar price-quantity space 
when the prices and cost/efficiency parameters are such that the different crops co-exist 
in the market. The inverse supply curves (derived from equations (I.16) and (I.17)) are 
given by: 
rghs
f
hsrg
f
rg xwpwp



 )(
)(

      (I.18) 
hsrg
f
rghs
f
hs xwpwp )()(        (I.19) 
and illustrate the interdependence between the two markets – the price and cost/ 
efficiency parameters associated with the production of a crop are direct arguments in the 
supply of its substitute.   
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Figure I.5.  Farm Supplies of Reference (rg) and High Quality Substitute (hs) Products 
 
Equations (I.16) and (I.17) can also be used to derive the demands for the inputs used in 
the production of the reference product and its high quality substitute. Specifically, in the 
case of a fixed proportions technology in the production of the crops under 
consideration,6 the input demands for the reference and high quality substitute crop 
production are, respectively:  
rghs
f
hs
f
rgrg xwppw



 )(
)(







      (I.20) 
hsrg
f
rg
f
hshs xwppw )()(        (I.21) 
Figure I.6 graphs these input demands. Similar to the demand and supply schedules 
derived earlier, the prices and cost parameters in a market have a direct effect on the 
input demand for the substitute.  
                                                          
6 For a variant of our framework modeling a variable proportions technology see the study on the 
future of agricultural cooperatives by Fulton and Giannakas (2013). The implications of a variable 
proportions technology are also discussed by Giannakas and Yiannaka (2018) in their study of the 
role of agricultural biotechnology in the fight against malnutrition and hunger.  
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Figure I.6.  Input Demands from Reference (rg) and High Quality Substitute (hs)  
       Producers 
 
Before concluding this section, it should be pointed out that, in addition to enabling the 
derivation of the input demands and supplies of the different products, the heterogeneous 
producer framework outlined above also enables us to derive theory-consistent measures 
of producer welfare. In particular, since the expressions in equation (I.13) are direct 
measures of the net returns associated with the production of the different products (i.e., 
price minus the costs associated with the unit production of a product), the area under the 
effective (bold dashed kinked) net returns curve in Figure I.4 shows the welfare of the 
different producers. Specifically, the welfare of producers of the reference product ( *rgNR ) 
and the high quality substitute ( *hsNR ) are given by: 
2
*
2
( ) ( )1
( )
2 2 ( )
rg
hs
A f f
rg rg hs hsf
rg rg rg rg hs rg
A
p w p w
NR NR d p w x x
 
 
  
        
  (I.22)
 
*
0
2
1
( )
2
( 2 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2( )
hsA
f
hs hs hs hs hs hs
f f f f
hs hs rg rg hs hs rg rg
NR NR d p w x x
p w p w p w p w
 
  
 
    
            


  (I.23)
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Aggregate producer welfare is given by the summation of *rgNR  and 
*
hsNR . If the 
distribution of producers is not uniform but is, for instance, skewed to the right (i.e., the 
probability mass has shifted towards zero), the greater is the number of relatively more 
efficient producers, the greater is the production share of the high quality substitute 
product and the greater the welfare of the producers of this product, *hsNR .  
Finally, it is important to note that there is a direct correspondence between the 
producer welfare measures presented above and the producer surplus measures derived 
from the supply schedules presented in Figure I.5. Specifically, while *rgNR  and 
*
hsNR in 
equations (I.22) and (I.23) measure the total net returns of producers of the regulated 
product and its high quality substitute (i.e., the areas under rgNR  and hsNR in Figure I.4), 
the surplus measures from the supply curves in Figure I.5 correspond to the surplus 
generated from the production of a product over and above its next best alternative. As a 
result, for given prices fhsp , 
f
rgp , rgw  and hsw , the producer surplus measures rgPS and 
hsPS  that could be calculated in Figure I.5 are equal to areas rgG  and hsG  in Figure I.4, 
where:
     
   
 
2
1
2 2
rg
hs
f fA
rg rg hs hsf f
rg rg rg hs rg rg hs hs rg
A
p w p w
PS G d p w p w x
 

   
                 
   
and  
     
   
 
2
0
1
.
2 2
hs
f fA
hs hs rg rgf f
hs hs hs rg hs hs rg rg hs
p w p w
PS G d p w p w x
 
   
          
     
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I.3. Middlemen and Input Suppliers 
Depending on the structure of the relevant supply channel, middlemen (e.g., processors 
and/or retailers) can exercise market power both when procuring the farm product from 
producers and when selling the processed food product to consumers (Sexton, 2000, 
2013). Facing the demand and supply schedules presented in equations (I.8), (I.9), (I.18) 
and (I.19), the profit-maximizing middlemen find it optimal to produce the quantity 
determined by the equality of the associated “marginal revenues” and “marginal outlays” 
and charge the maximum price consumers are willing to pay for this quantity (determined 
by the point on the demand curve that corresponds to the produced output) while offering 
producers the minimum price that would induce them to supply the necessary quantity of 
the farm product (given by the corresponding point of the relevant supply curve).7  
To capture this behavior, the framework uses the parameters bi  and 
s
i , where 
i{rg, hs}, b refers to buyers and s refers to sellers. These parameters determine the 
location of the relevant “marginal revenue” and “marginal outlay” curves, and capture the 
degree to which output is restricted when procuring the farm product from producers and 
when selling the processed food product to consumers.8 Figure I.7 graphs the profit-
maximizing decisions of the middlemen in the markets for the reference product and its 
high quality substitute.  
 
                                                          
7 When determining marginal revenue and marginal outlay, it is assumed that marginal costs of 
processing are zero. 
8 The  parameters are often referred to as conjectural variation elasticities and are assumed to 
take values between zero and one. A value of  =1 corresponds to a monopoly/monopsony; a 
value of  =0 reflects either a perfectly competitive market structure or oligopolistic price 
competition à la Bertrand; while a value of  (0,1) corresponds to various oligopolistic/ 
oligopsonistic market structures (Perloff, Karp and Golan, 2007). The  parameters have also been 
used to model firm behavior and to capture market power in equilibrium displacement models 
(Holloway, 1991; Sexton, 2000). 
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Figure I.7.  Determination of Consumer and Producer Prices and Output by Processors/  
       Retailers with Oligopolistic and Oligopsonistic Market Power   
 
Market structure also plays a role in the supply of farm inputs. Following the approach 
adopted in the case of middlemen and using the output restriction parameters Irg  and ,
I
hs  
the location of the relevant “marginal revenue” curves for the input suppliers is 
determined. To focus the analysis on the activities downstream of the input suppliers, it is 
assumed that the input suppliers face constant marginal costs. Figure I.8 graphs the profit-
maximizing decisions of the input suppliers in the rg and hs markets. 
 
0 
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Figure I.8.  Determination of Farm Input Prices and Output by Oligopolistic Input Suppliers  
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I.4. Market Equilibrium  
Given the demand and supply schedules presented in equations (I.8), (I.9), (I.18), and 
(I.19), and the output restriction parameters (the θs), we can determine the equilibrium 
prices and quantities in the reference and substitute product and input markets. 
Specifically, solving the following 14 equations simultaneously gives the equilibrium 
values for the consumer and farm prices of the reference good, the consumer and farm 
prices of the substitute good, the input prices for the reference and substitute good, and 
the output of the regulated and substitute goods (the model also determines four marginal 
revenues and two marginal outlays).  
  rgchscrg xpp 
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The mathematical expressions for the equilibrium prices and quantities in each market, 
conditional on the equilibrium prices in the other horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
markets, are as follows: 
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The expressions in equations (I.24)-(I.31) nicely capture the interdependence between the 
different markets with the price, cost, preference and market power parameters in one 
market showing up as direct arguments in the equilibrium expressions for the prices and 
quantities in its substitute market. As demonstrated in the analysis that follows, the nature 
of the interdependence of markets captured by the expressions above provides valuable 
insights on the mechanism through which a market or policy change affects the different 
vertically, horizontally and diagonally related markets. To reflect their nature, in what 
follows these equilibrium expressions are referred to as market reaction functions.  
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Solving the equations for the equilibrium prices simultaneously allows the 
expression of the output and input prices as functions of the exogenous variables of the 
model (i.e., preference, cost and market power parameters). Substituting these prices into 
the expressions for the equilibrium quantities provides the expression of all equilibrium 
conditions as functions of the exogenous variables of the model (i.e., the reduced form 
equations). The system-wide equilibrium conditions are graphed in Figure I.9.  
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Figure I.9.  System-Wide Equilibrium Conditions  
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I.5. Welfare Analysis 
With the equilibrium prices and quantities derived, the economic welfare of the various 
agents in the system can be determined. The gross profits of the middlemen are 
determined by multiplying the difference between the buying price and selling price by 
the quantity sold, while the gross profits of the input suppliers are determined by 
multiplying the difference between the selling price and marginal cost by the quantity 
sold (net profits can be calculated from gross profits by subtracting fixed costs). 
Consumer utility and producer net returns can be determined as outlined above by using 
the utility and net return expressions presented in equations (I.10)-(I.12), and equations 
(I.22) and (I.23), respectively. 
 As will be shown in the next sections, the equilibrium model derived above can 
be used to determine the impact of market changes and policy interventions. One of the 
key issues addressed in the literature is the measurement of the change in economic 
welfare resulting from market changes and policy interventions in linked markets. A key 
conclusion from the literature is that the aggregate welfare impact can be measured in the 
market where the market or policy shock is introduced using general equilibrium demand 
and supply curves (see Buse (1958), Thurman and Wohlgenant (1989), Thurman (1991), 
Panzar and Willig (1978) and Just and Hueth (1979)).9 In addition, as Thurman (1991) 
points out, when two markets are linked in both supply and demand, as is the case in the 
multi-market framework presented in this book, the aggregate welfare impact can only be 
obtained if both the general equilibrium supply and demand curves are used to calculate 
the change in total economic surplus. 
It is important to note, however, that the aggregate welfare impacts determined 
from general equilibrium demand and supply curves are net impacts and do not separate 
out the effects on each of the various groups (e.g., consumers, producers, middlemen, 
                                                          
9 A general equilibrium curve shows the relationship between the price of a good and the quantity 
consumed/produced of that good when the rest of the prices that are arguments in the curve are 
allowed to adjust according to equilibrium conditions in their respective markets. Thus, the 
general equilibrium demand curve for the regulated good does not hold the price of the substitute 
good constant, but instead allows the price of that good to change according to the supply and 
demand equilibrium in that market. 
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input suppliers). The distributional impacts of a policy can be determined in equilibrium 
models by calculating the welfare changes in each market; this is done by integrating 
under the appropriate demand and supply curves (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 1982). To do 
so, however, requires the supply and demand curves in each market. 
The conclusions outlined above apply, of course, to the model developed in this 
book. Thus, the aggregate welfare changes can be determined either by the use of general 
equilibrium supply and demand curves, or by calculating the welfare changes in each 
market and then aggregating the results. In our case, of course, the aggregate welfare 
results can also be calculated by directly determining the utility and net returns as 
outlined in equations (I.10)-(I.12) and (I.22)-(I.23), and then aggregating these measures. 
While it is relatively easy to estimate the distributional impacts of a market 
change or policy intervention using supply and demand curves if it is assumed consumers 
and producers are homogeneous, this is much more difficult to do when consumer and 
producer heterogeneity are explicitly taken into account. The reason is that different 
agents react to the regulation in different ways and thus experience different gains or 
losses, and these differential impacts need to be determined on an individual basis. For 
instance, in the case of increased middlemen market power or a consumption tax, some 
consumers (producers) that were originally consuming (producing) the 
reference/regulated good switch their consumption (production) to the substitute good. 
To be able to properly allocate the benefits and costs to individual consumers 
(producers), it is necessary to keep track of which product they are consuming 
(producing). The utility and net return framework outlined above allows us to do this. 
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I.6. Alternative Considerations and Model Formulations 
Consumer Heterogeneity  
While our analysis focuses on quality- (or vertically-) differentiated products (i.e., 
products that are uniformly quality- and, thus, utility-ranked by consumers; see 
Giannakas (2011)), the framework can be easily adapted to study markets of horizontally- 
(or variety-) differentiated products (i.e., markets where consumers are alike in their basic 
willingness to pay for a product but differ in the product characteristics they consider 
important; see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) and Mérel and Sexton (2011)). Hybrid 
markets of both vertical and horizontal product differentiation can also be studied using 
this framework. Examples of models accommodating this consumer preference structure 
(and heterogeneity) include those developed and utilized to study the market and welfare 
impacts of consumer-oriented second generation GM products (Giannakas and Yiannaka, 
2008) and quality-enhancing product innovation activity by consumer cooperatives 
(Drivas and Giannakas, 2010). Finally, the framework can be adapted to study cases in 
which the relevant/important differentiating consumer attribute is income (rather than 
preferences; see Tirole (1988), pp. 96-97, and Giannakas and Yiannaka (2018)). Once the 
relevant demand schedules (and welfare measures) for these cases have been derived, the 
rest of the framework structure (and links between markets) are similar to those presented 
in this book.  
 
Producer Heterogeneity  
Similar to the consumer case, our framework can be adapted to accommodate a wide 
array of sources of producer heterogeneity. Thus, in addition to producer efficiency and 
costs of production, alternative sources of heterogeneity that can be relevant determinants 
of producer behavior and modeled using our framework’s structure include the 
producers’ physical location (Greenhut, Norman and Hung, 1987), ideology and 
commitment to different organizations (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001, 2013), observability 
of their actions (Giannakas, 2002b; Giannakas and Kaplan, 2005; Meerza, Giannakas and 
Yiannaka, 2018, 2019), personal goals and objectives (Giannakas, Fulton and Sesmero, 
2016), and level of risk aversion (Mavroutsikos, Giannakas and Walters, 2018). Once the 
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relevant supply schedules (and welfare measures) for these cases have been derived, the 
rest of the framework structure (and links between markets) are similar to those presented 
in this book. 
 
Market Structure, Organizational Forms & Trade 
In addition to capturing different forms of consumer and producer heterogeneity, the 
framework can also accommodate a wide range of other market arrangements and forms 
of strategic interaction among the key actors in the relevant supply channels. For 
instance, it is possible to disaggregate the middlemen and consider relevant successive or 
bilateral monopoly/oligopoly situations between processors and retailers (see Waterson 
(1984)); strategic and extensive (i.e., sequential) price or quantity competition between 
relevant middlemen or/and input suppliers under different objectives and/or information 
structures could also be modeled. Examples of game-theoretic models of strategic 
interactions in pure and mixed oligopolies and oligopsonies that have been developed in 
the context of our framework include Fulton and Giannakas (2001), Giannakas and 
Fulton (2005), Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006), and Drivas and Giannakas (2008, 2010).  
 Our framework is also equipped (and has been used) to study collective action 
institutions like cooperative organizations. In addition to operating in markets for 
(quality- and variety-) differentiated products (facing, this way, significant heterogeneity 
in the consumer valuation of, and willingness-to-pay for their products), cooperatives 
face significant member heterogeneity and, while they normally focus on maximizing the 
welfare of their members, they, more often than not, find themselves competing with 
profit-maximizing investor-owned firms in imperfectly competitive markets of the sort 
modeled in our framework. In addition to capturing the essence of the aforementioned 
environment (i.e., consumer and producer heterogeneity, market power and different 
objectives of the firms involved), our framework enables the distinction between 
members and non-members of the cooperative(s) and changes in the membership due to 
different policies and strategies of the cooperative and its rivals. Examples of cooperative 
studies using adaptations of our framework of analysis include the study of the impact of 
different types of cooperative organizations on (product and process) innovation activity 
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in oligopolistic and oligopsonistic markets (Giannakas and Fulton, 2005; Drivas and 
Giannakas, 2008, 2010); the impact of member commitment on market outcomes (Fulton 
and Giannakas, 2001); horizon and free-rider problems in cooperative organizations 
(Fulton and Giannakas, 2012; Giannakas, Fulton and Sesmero, 2016); and the future of 
agricultural cooperatives (Fulton and Giannakas, 2013).  
Finally, it is important to note that, while our formulation assumes that domestic 
agricultural producers supply both the regulated and the substitute products, the model 
can be modified to analyze cases where the high quality substitute and/or part of the 
regulated product are imported from the international market, for instance. Similarly, the 
heterogeneous consumer framework can be adapted to model either consumer behavior in 
different countries or the behavior of (heterogeneous) consumers in the world market for 
these products. Examples of studies utilizing variants of our framework in a multi-market 
trade context include Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006), Plastina, Giannakas and Pick 
(2011) and Giannakas and Yiannaka (2018).  
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II.   Market Analysis  
This part of the book utilizes the methodological framework developed in Section I to 
analyze the market and (disaggregated) welfare impacts of changes in important 
determinants of market behavior and outcomes (and key exogenous parameters of our 
model) like consumer preferences, market structure at different stages of the supply 
channel of interest, and cost structure. In particular, the following sections focus on the 
analysis of: 
1. Changes in the consumer preferences for the good under study  
2. Changes in the oligopolistic and/or oligopsonistic power of middlemen  
3. Changes in the oligopolistic power of input suppliers  
4. Changes in the cost structure of input suppliers  
While the impact of these changes can be derived mathematically through the 
differentiation of the equilibrium conditions with respect to the parameters of interest (λ, 
the different θs, and 
I
rgc ), our main focus here is on analyzing the impact of these 
changes on the market in which they occur and carefully tracing the effects on the 
vertically, horizontally and diagonally related markets. As noted earlier, the market 
reaction functions in equations (I.24)-(I.31) are uniquely equipped to assist in this 
endeavor. 
 
II.1. Changes in Consumer Preferences  
To determine the system-wide market and welfare impacts of a change in consumer 
preferences for the good under study, we compare and contrast the equilibrium prices, 
quantities, and welfare of the interest groups involved before and after the change in 
consumer preferences. Such a change in consumer preferences can be the outcome of 
new information about the product, changes in its quality characteristics, quality-
enhancing product innovation activity, advertising, and lifestyle changes. As noted 
earlier, our main focus here is on discussing the impact on the market in which the 
change occurs and carefully tracing its effects on the vertically, horizontally and 
diagonally related markets.  
- 33 - 
 
 
 
The expressions in equations (I.24)-(I.31) capture the interdependence between 
the markets for the reference product and its substitute as the price, cost, and preference 
parameters in a market are direct arguments in the equilibrium expressions for its 
substitute. As a result, these expressions along with the related graphical representation, 
provide valuable insights on the mechanism through which a parameter affects the 
various interrelated markets. The rest of this section discusses the market and welfare 
impacts of a change in consumer preferences using the integrated heterogeneous agent 
framework presented in Section I. 
 
System-Wide Market and Welfare Effects of Change in Consumer Preferences  
The analysis in this part focuses on the impact of an increase in the consumer valuation 
for the reference product on the input and output markets for the reference product and its 
substitute, as well as its effects on the welfare of all interest groups involved (i.e., 
consumers, producers, middlemen and input suppliers in the markets for the two 
products). In addition to determining changes in the aggregate consumer and producer 
welfare, the heterogeneous agent framework enables us to determine the effects of the 
change in consumer preferences on different consumers and producers of the two 
products. Furthermore, by explicitly considering the interaction between the markets for 
the reference product and its substitute, the framework allows us to capture relevant 
indirect and feedback effects that are not accounted for when focusing solely on the 
market of the reference product.10  
Beginning with the direct consumer effects of the change in consumer 
preferences, we see that an increase in the consumer valuation of the reference product, λ, 
(a) increases the utility associated with the consumption of this product (see equation 
(I.1)) and (b) attracts previous consumers of substitute products to the reference good. 
Graphically, the increase in λ causes an upward rotation of rgU  through the point 
c
rgU p  
                                                          
10 While our analysis focuses on the case where the reference good and its substitute coexist after 
the increase in λ, the framework can be used to examine the case where the increase in λ is such 
that it drives the high quality substitute product out of the market (i.e., when 
' ': ( )c crg hs ls hs rgU U p p           ). 
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in Figure II.1.1 and the switching of consumers with differentiating attributes  
'( , ]ls ls    and 
'( , ]rg rg    to the reference product.  
 
 
Figure II.1.1.  Direct Effects of Increased λ on Consumption Decisions  
 
The increased consumer valuation of the reference good and the subsequent attraction of 
previous consumers of substitute products increases the demand for the reference product 
and, through this, increases the consumer and producer prices of this product (see 
equations (I.24), (I.25) and (I.30)). Figure II.1.2 graphs the upward shift of rgD and 
consequent increases in 
c
rgp , 
f
rgp  and rgx  due to the increased λ. 
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Figure II.1.2.  Direct Effects of Increased λ on the Oligemporistic rg Market   
 
In addition to affecting the market for the reference product, the increased consumer 
valuation of rg has a direct impact on the market for its substitute product. As shown 
earlier, the increased λ attracts to the reference good previous consumers of the substitute 
product, which reduces the demand for this product, and, through this, reduces the 
equilibrium quantity and (consumer and producer) prices of the substitute product (see 
equations (I.26), (I.27) and (I.31)). Formally, the increased λ  causes a downward shift of 
the demand for the substitute product, 
hsD , and a reduction in hsx , 
c
hsp  and 
f
hsp  in Figure 
II.1.3.    
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Figure II.1.3.  Direct Effects of Increased λ on the Oligemporistic Market for the 
           Substitute hs Product 
 
Moving to the direct producer effects of the increased λ, we see that the increase in the 
producer price 
f
rgp  and decrease in 
f
hsp  (a) increase the net returns associated with the 
production of the reference product, (b) reduce the net returns associated with the 
production of its high quality substitute, and (c) drive previous producers of the substitute 
and alternative crops to the reference product. Graphically, the increase in 
f
rgp  causes an 
upward parallel shift of rgNR  while the reduction in 
f
hsp  causes a downward parallel shift 
of hsNR  and the switching of producers with differentiating attributes 
'( , ]hs hsA A A  and 
'( , ]rg rgA A A  in Figure II.1.4 to the reference product.  
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Figure II.1.4.  Direct Effects of Increased λ on Producer Decisions 
 
The changes in the production decisions described above have a direct impact on the 
markets for the inputs used in the production of the reference product and its substitute. 
In particular, the increased consumer valuation of the reference product increases the 
demand for inputs used in the production of this product (as the equilibrium quantity of 
the reference product increases with λ) and decreases the demand for inputs used in the 
production of the substitute (so that the reduced production of this product under a 
stronger consumer preference for the reference good can be facilitated).  
The increased equilibrium price and quantity of the inputs used in the production 
of the reference product result in increased profits for the suppliers of these inputs, while 
the reduced price and quantity of the inputs used in the production of the substitute 
decrease the profits of the suppliers of these inputs. The change in the profits of the rg  
input suppliers is given by 
' '( ) ( ) 0I I Irg rg rg rg rg rg rgw c x w c x      , while the change in 
the profits of the hs input suppliers is 
' '( ) ( ) 0I I Ihs hs hs hs hs hs hsw c x w c x          (see 
Figure II.1.5).  
It is important to note that the changes in rgw and hsw  have a feedback effect on 
the markets of these inputs. Specifically, the increase in rgw  (decrease in hsw ) increases 
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I
hsD  (reduces 
I
rgD ) (see equations (I.20) and (I.21) and Figure I.6) which, in turn, lessens 
the impact of the increased λ on the prices and quantities of these inputs (see equations 
(I.28) and (I.29)). The total effects of the increased λ on the input markets are depicted in 
Figure II.1.5. 
 
 
Figure II.1.5.  Impact of Increased 𝜆 on Input Markets 
 
In addition to affecting the market of the other input, the changes in the input prices 
affect the net returns associated with the production of the reference product and its 
substitute (with the increase in rgw  and decrease in hsw  moderating the changes depicted 
in Figure II.1.4). Figure II.1.6 graphs the total effects of the change in λ on the producers 
of the reference product and its substitute. In addition to depicting the total market effects 
of a change in λ, Figure II.1.6 shows that the producers gaining the most from the 
increased λ are those producing the reference product both before and after the increase in 
λ (i.e., producers with ( , ]),hs rgA A A  followed by producers who switch from the 
alternative and substitute crops to the reference good (i.e., producers with 
'( , ]rg rgA A A  
and "( , ]).hs hsA A A  Producers who continue to produce the substitute product after the 
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increase in λ (i.e., producers with '[0, ])hsA A  lose, as do some of the high quality 
substitute product producers who switch to the reference product (i.e., producers with 
' "( , )),hs hsA A A with the magnitude of this loss determined by the differentiating attribute  
of these producers. Total producer gains and losses from the increased λ, are given by  
'
''
' ' '( ) ( ) ( )
rg rghs
hs hs rg
A AA
p rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
G NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA         and 
' ''
'
' '
0
( ) ( )
hs hs
hs
A A
p hs hs hs rg
A
L NR NR dA NR NR dA     , respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure II.1.6.  Total Impact of Increased λ on Producer Decisions and Welfare 
 
By affecting the producer net returns, the changes in the input prices also affect the 
supply schedules of the two products graphed in Figures II.1.2 and II.1.3 (with the 
changes in the input prices decreasing rgS  and increasing hsS ). The supply (and demand) 
schedules for the two products are also affected by the producer (and consumer) prices of 
their substitute (with the decrease in chsp  and 
f
hsp  shifting rgD  and rgS  downwards, and 
the increase in 
c
rgp  and 
f
rgp  shifting hsD  and hsS upwards, moderating the impact of the 
higher λ in these markets; recall equations (I.8), (I.9), (I.18) and (I.19)). The total effects 
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of these changes in the two markets are depicted in Figure II.1.7. Suppliers of the 
reference product realize an increase in their profits, with the change given by 
' ' ' ' '( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0c c c f f frg rg rg rg rg rg rg rg rg rg rgp p x p p x x p p x         ,  
while the suppliers of the substitute see their profits fall with the change given by 
' ' ' ' '( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0.c c c f f fhs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hsp p x p p x x p p x               
  
Figure II.1.7.  Total Impact of Increased λ on the rg and hs Markets  
 
Finally, the changes in the consumer prices crgp  and 
c
hsp  also affect the utility associated 
with the consumption of these products, moderating the direct impact of the increased λ 
depicted in Figure II.1.1. In particular, the increased crgp  reduces the utility associated 
with the consumption of the reference product, while the reduced chsp  increases the 
utility associated with the consumption of the substitute product (and reduce the number 
of consumers switching to the reference good). Figure II.1.8 depicts these market and 
welfare effects as well as the asymmetric impacts of the increased λ on consumer welfare 
in the consumer utility space. Consumers gaining the most from the increased λ are those 
consuming the reference product both before and after the increase in λ and have 
relatively stronger preference for quality (i.e., consumers located closer to ),rg followed 
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by consumers who find it optimal to switch from the high quality substitute to the 
reference product (i.e., consumers with 
'( , ]).rg rg    Consumers who prefer the 
substitute product before and after the increase in λ (i.e., consumers with  
'( ,1])rg  also gain, as do consumers with 
'( , ]ls ls    who enter the market for the 
reference product (the magnitude of this gain depends on the differentiating attribute α of  
these consumers). Consumer gains in this case are given by  
'
' '
1
' ' ' '( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
rg rgls
ls ls rg rg
c rg ls rg rg rg hs hs hsG U U d U U d U U d U U d
 
   
              .  
 
Figure II.1.8.  Total Effects of Increased λ on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
                        under Scenario I 
 
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that the above analysis on the total 
effects of the increased λ on consumption decisions and welfare (and Figure II.1.8) are 
based on the assumption that the (positive) impact of the higher λ on the utility associated 
with the consumption of the reference product outweighs the (negative) effect of 
increased consumer price crgp  for all consumers of the reference product (i.e., 
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c
ls rgp   , 
'
ls ls   and consumers of the reference product with lower valuation of 
the good (i.e., consumers with lower values of α) realize a welfare loss and some of them 
exit the market for this product.  
Figure II.1.9 graphs this case (termed as Scenario II) and shows that, when 
'
ls ls  , consumers with 
"( , )ls ls    lose (with the welfare loss decreasing with the 
strength of their preference for quality) and those with '( , ]ls ls    find it optimal to 
exit the market for the reference product.  
 
Figure II.1.9.  Total Effects of Increased λ on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
                        under Scenario II  
 
While the relationship between ls  and 
c
rgp  determines whether there will be 
consumers losing from the increased λ and consumers exiting the market for the reference 
good, the rest of the results are qualitatively the same with those examined earlier (i.e., 
those under Scenario I where 
c
ls rgp   ).   
Table II.1.1 summarizes the effects of increased 𝜆 on the welfare of all relevant 
interest groups, while Figures II.1.10 and II.1.11 summarize the system-wide market and 
welfare impacts of the increase in 𝜆 under the two scenarios considered here. For 
simplicity, the feedback effects on the rg and hs markets (depicted in Figure II.1.6) are 
not included in these Figures.  
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Table II.1.1.  System-Wide Welfare Impacts of a Change in Consumer Preferences, λ 
 Consumers 
of ls 
switching   
to rg 
Consumers 
of rg 
switching   
to ls 
Consumers 
of rg 
Consumers 
of hs 
switching   
to rg 
Consumers 
of hs 
Producers   
of rg 
Producers   
of hs 
switching   
to rg 
Producers   
of hs 
Suppliers   
of rg 
Suppliers   
of hs 
Input 
Suppliers   
rg 
Input 
Suppliers      
hs 
Scenario   
I 
+ NA + + + + some –  
some + 
– + – + – 
Scenario 
II 
NA – some –  
some + 
+ + + some –  
some + 
– + – + – 
+    denotes welfare gains 
–    denotes welfare losses 
NA denotes non applicable 
 
Condition for Scenario I: 
c
ls rgp     
Condition for Scenario II: 
c
ls rgp    
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Figure II.1.10.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of a Change in λ under Scenario I 
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II.2 Increased Market Power of Middlemen            
The focus of this section is on the determination of the system-wide market and welfare 
impacts of increased market power of the middlemen in the supply channel of the 
reference product. Such an increase could be the outcome of things like increased 
concentration, collusive behavior among middlemen, stricter regulatory requirements that 
drive some firms out of the market, intellectual property rights, and merger and 
acquisition activity. Similar to the case of changing consumer preferences, to determine 
the system-wide market and welfare impacts of an increased middlemen market power, 
we compare and contrast the equilibrium prices, quantities, and welfare of the interest 
groups involved before and after the increase in market power. With the initial 
equilibrium conditions derived in Section I (and graphed in Figure I.9), our focus here is 
on the (system-wide) equilibrium conditions under the increased market power. Once we 
determine the effects of the increased market power on the market where it is exercised, 
we proceed in discussing its impacts on the vertically, horizontally and diagonally related 
markets and interest groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, middlemen and input 
suppliers in the supply channels of the reference and substitute products).  
 
Equilibrium Conditions under Increased 𝜽𝒓𝒈
𝒔  and/or 𝜽𝒓𝒈
𝒃    
The increase in the market power of middlemen in the supply channel of the reference 
product can refer to increased market power when selling the final product to consumers 
(i.e., increased oligopolistic power, captured by an increased market power parameter  
s
rg ) or/and increased market power when procuring the agricultural product from 
producers (i.e., increased oligopsonistic power, captured by an increased market power 
parameter 
b
rg ). In either case, the increased market power of middlemen translates into 
(a) increased consumer price ;
c
rgp  (b) reduced producer price ;
f
rgp  (c) reduced quantity 
;rgx  and (d) increased middlemen profits .rg  Graphically, the increased 
s
rg  can be 
depicted as creating a downward rotation of the marginal revenue curve facing the 
middlemen through its intercept at ,chsp


while the increased 
b
rg  can be depicted as  
creating an upward rotation of the marginal outlay curve facing the middlemen through 
its intercept at ( ).frg hs hsw p w


   These changes are illustrated in Figure II.2.1.                                      
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Figure II.2.1.  Increased Market Power of Middlemen 
 
Since the implications of increased 
s
rg and 
b
rg are the same, in what follows we refer to 
increased middlemen market power as increased rg with the understanding that this 
increase can originate either from their oligopolistic or from their oligopsonistic position 
in the supply channel of the reference good.               
In addition to affecting the market for the reference product, the increased rg has 
an effect on the vertically, horizontally and diagonally related markets and our integrated 
framework of analysis can help identify the system-wide market and welfare impacts of 
this increase. Note that the equilibrium conditions/market reaction functions under the 
increased rg can be derived by substituting 
's
rg  and 
'b
rg  for 
s
rg  and 
b
rg , respectively, in 
equations (I.24)-(I.31)). As mentioned earlier, the nature of the interdependence of markets 
captured by these expressions provides, along with the related graphical representation, 
valuable insights on the mechanism through which the increased rg affects the different 
vertically, horizontally, and diagonally related markets. The section below discusses the 
market and welfare impacts of the increased rg using the integrated heterogeneous agent 
framework presented in Section I. 
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System-Wide Market and Welfare Effects of Increased 𝜽𝒓𝒈   
The analysis in this part focuses on the impact of the increased rg on the input and 
output markets for the reference product and its substitute, as well as its effects on the 
welfare of all interest groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, middlemen and input 
suppliers in the markets for the two products). In addition to determining changes in the 
aggregate consumer and producer welfare, our integrated heterogeneous agent framework 
enables us to (a) determine the effects of the increased rg on different consumers and 
producers of the two products and (b) capture indirect and feedback effects that are not 
accounted for when focusing solely on the market of the reference product.  
Beginning with the direct consumer effects of the increased rg , we see that the 
increase in the consumer price of the reference product (a) reduces the utility associated 
with the consumption of this product and (b) drives consumers of the reference product to 
substitute products. Graphically, the increase in 
c
rgp causes a downward parallel shift of 
rgU  and the exit of consumers with differentiating attributes 
'( , ]ls ls    and  
'( , ]rg rg    in Figure II.2.2 from the market for the reference product.  
 
 
Figure II.2.2.  Direct Effects of Increased rg on Consumption Decisions  
rg
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Similar to consumers, the increase in rg hurts the producers of the reference product and 
results in a number of them switching to alternative crops. Graphically, the reduced 
f
rgp  
causes an downward parallel shift of the net returns curve associated with the production 
of the reference product and the switching of producers with '( , ]hs hsA A A  and 
'( , ]rg rgA A A  in Figure II.2.3 to alternative products.  
 
Figure II.2.3.  Direct Effects of Increased rg on Producer Decisions   
 
In addition to affecting the market for the reference product, the changes in the consumer 
and producer prices of the reference product caused by the increased rg have a direct 
impact on the market for the substitute product. In particular, the increased consumer 
price and the reduced producer price of the reference product (due to the increased rg ) 
drive a number of consumers and producers out of the market for the reference product 
affecting, this way, both the demand for and supply of the substitute product.  
Formally, the increased 
c
rgp causes an upward parallel shift of the demand for the 
substitute product, hsD (see equation (I.9) and Figure II.2.4), while the reduced
f
rgp causes 
a downward parallel shift of the supply of the substitute product, hsS (see equation (I.19) 
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and Figure II.2.4). While the increased demand for, and supply of the substitute product 
always increase the equilibrium quantity and profits of the suppliers of this product, the 
effect on the equilibrium consumer and producer prices ( chsp  and 
f
hsp , respectively) is 
determined by the relative magnitude of the demand and supply effects of the increased 
rg on the market for the substitute product. In particular, since a ceteris paribus increase 
in hsD  causes 
c
hsp  and 
f
hsp  to increase, while a similar increase in hsS  results in reduced 
c
hsp  and 
f
hsp , when the demand effect dominates the supply effect so that 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
 (where, as noted above, 
0crgp   and 0,
f
rgp  while, as shown in Figure II.2.11 below, 0rgw   and 0),hsw 
the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product increase after the increase in 
rg (Scenario I); when 
( ) (1 )( )
(1 )( ) ( )
f c
rg rg hs rgs b
hs hs
s b
fhs hs
rg rg hs
p w w p
p w w
 
     
     
 

            
   
       
,  
the consumer price of the substitute product increases while the producer price falls 
(Scenario II); while when the supply effect of the increased rg dominates the demand 
effect so that 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
, the increased 
rg causes the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product to fall (Scenario 
III). Figure II.2.4 provides a graphical representation of the conditions leading to the 
three scenarios while panels 1, 2 and 3 of Figure II.2.5 graph the effects of the increased 
rg on the market of the substitute product under these three scenarios.  
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Figure II.2.5.  Effects of Increased rg on the Market for the Substitute hs Product 
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panel 3: Scenario III
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Figure II.2.4.  Scenarios on the Effects of Increased rg on the Prices of Substitute hs Product 
 
Figure II.2.4.  Effects of Fat Tax on Market for Substitute hs Product 
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It is important to note that for Scenario II to occur, the middlemen in the substitute  
product market should be able to exercise market power. If 0s bhs hs   , the condition 
for Scenario I becomes 
c f
rg rg rg hsp p w w
 
 

        
 and the condition for 
Scenario III becomes 
c f
rg rg rg hsp p w w
 
 

        
. Intuitively, under perfectly  
competitive middlemen in the substitute product market, the consumer and producer 
prices of this product will always move in the same direction. While the presence of 
middlemen market power is necessary for the consumer and producer prices of the 
substitute product to move in different directions, it is not sufficient for the emergence of 
Scenario II – as shown above, both Scenarios I and III can emerge in the presence of 
middlemen market power.  
Since the equilibrium prices of the substitute product affect the welfare of the 
consumers and producers of this product, our analysis considers the market and welfare 
impacts of the increased rg under the three scenarios outlined above. The case where the 
increased rg causes the consumer and producer prices of its substitute product to increase 
(i.e., the case in which the demand effect dominates the supply effect of the increased rg ) 
is analyzed first followed by the other two scenarios considered here. In all cases, suppliers 
of the substitute product see their profits increase after the increase in rg , with the change 
in profits given by ' ' ' ' '( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0.c c c f f fhs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hsp p x p p x x p p x             
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Increased rg under Scenario I  
(i.e., when 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
) 
As mentioned previously, when the demand effect of increased rg dominates its supply 
effect, the increase in rg increases the consumer and producer prices of its substitute 
product (recall panel 1 of Figure II.2.5 that depicts this scenario in the price-quantity 
space).  
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The increased consumer price of the substitute product, chsp , reduces the utility 
associated with the consumption of this product and limits the number of consumers of 
the reference product switching to the substitute. Figure II.2.6 depicts these market and 
welfare effects in the consumer utility space. In addition, the figure shows that the 
consumers hurt the most from the increased rg are those consuming the reference 
product both before and after the increase in rg (i.e., consumers with 
' '( , ]),ls rg    
followed by consumers who find it optimal to turn away from the reference product (i.e., 
consumers with 
'( , ]rg rg    and 
'( , ]),ls ls   and consumers who consume the 
substitute before and after the increase in rg (i.e., consumers with ( ,1]).rg  Total  
consumer losses from the increased rg are given by 
''
' '
1
' ' '( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
rg rgls
ls ls rg rg
c rg ls rg rg rg hs hs hsL U U d U U d U U d U U d
 
   
              . 
 
 
Figure II.2.6.  Total Effects of Increased rg on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
           under Scenarios I & II 
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While the increased chsp  reduces the desirability of the substitute product for consumers, 
the increased 
f
hsp  under Scenario I increases the net returns associated with the 
production of the substitute product and, thus, increases the incentives for switching to 
the production of this product. Figure II.2.7 depicts these market and welfare effects as 
well as the asymmetric impacts of the increased rg in the producer net returns space. 
Producers losing the most from the increased rg  are those producing the reference 
product both before and after the increase in rg (i.e., producers with
' '( , ]),hs rgA A A  
followed by producers who find it optimal to switch from the reference product to the 
alternative crop (i.e., producers with
'( , )),rg rgA A A and the producers with 
" '( , ]hs hsA A A  who switch from the reference product to the substitute.  
Producers who produce the substitute before and after the increase in rg (i.e., 
producers with [0, ])hsA A  gain, as do some of the reference product producers who 
switch to the substitute (i.e., producers with "( , )),hs hsA A A with the magnitude of this 
gain determined by the efficiency parameter/differentiating attribute of these producers.  
Producer gains and losses in this case are given by  
''
' '
0
( ) ( )
hs hs
hs
A A
p hs hs hs rg
A
G NR NR dA NR NR dA      and 
''
'' ' '
' '( ) ( ) ( )
rg rghs
hs hs rg
A AA
p rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
L NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA        , respectively.  
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Figure II.2.7.  Total Effects of Increased rg on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
           under Scenario I 
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s b
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p w w p
p w w
 
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 

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   
       
) 
As shown in panel 2 of Figure II.2.5, under Scenario II the consumer price of the 
substitute product increases while the producer price falls causing both consumers and 
producers of this product to lose.  
 Predictably, the ramifications of the increased rg  for the consumers of the 
different products are similar to those under Scenario I (described in the previous section 
and graphed in Figure II.2.6), as chsp  increases under both Scenarios I and II. Thus, the 
increased rg  under Scenario II hurts all reference and substitute product consumers 
with the greater losses incurred by those consumers who buy the reference product both 
before and after the increase in .rg  
 Unlike Scenario I, producers of the substitute product lose under Scenario II as 
the increased rg  causes the producer price of the substitute product, 
f
hsp , to fall. The 
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reduced 
f
hsp  reduces the net returns associated with the production of this product and 
limits/reduces the number of producers who find it optimal to switch to the substitute 
product after the increase in rg (recall that the reduction in the price received by the 
producers of the reference product creates incentives for a number of them to switch to 
the substitute and alternative crops; see Figure II.2.3).  
Figure II.2.8 depicts these market and welfare effects in the producer net returns 
space. In addition, the figure shows that the producers losing the most from the increased 
rg are those producing the reference product both before and after the increase in rg (i.e., 
producers with
' '( , ]),hs rgA A A followed by producers who switch from the reference to the 
alternative and substitute crops (i.e., producers with
'( , )rg rgA A A and
'( , ]),hs hsA A A and 
producers who continue to produce the substitute product after the increase in rg  (i.e.,  
producers with [0, ]).hsA A Total producer losses from the increased rg are 
''
' '
' ' '
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
rg rghs hs
hs hs rg
A AA A
p hs hs rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
L NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA            
 
 
Figure II.2.8.  Total Effects of Increased rg on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
           under Scenarios II & III 
'
rgA
hs
f
hs
wp 
0 1
Differentiating Producer Attribute (A) 
rgx
Net Returns 
'
hsA
hs
x
rg
f
rg wp 
rgAhsA
''
rg
f
rg wp 
''
hs
f
hs
wp 
'
rgx
'
hsx
- 57 - 
 
 
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Increased rg under Scenario III  
(i.e., when 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
) 
When the supply effect of the increased rg dominates the demand effect, the increase in 
rg causes the consumer and producer prices of the substitute good to fall. While the 
effects of the reduced 
f
hsp  on producer decisions and welfare are similar to those under 
Scenario II (described in the previous section and graphed in Figure II.2.8), the effects of 
the increased rg on consumers are different than those under Scenarios I and II. 
 Specifically, the reduced chsp  increases the utility associated with the 
consumption of the substitute product and increases the number of consumers switching 
from the reference product. Figure II.2.9 depicts these market and welfare effects as well 
as the asymmetric impacts of the increased rg on consumer welfare in the consumer 
utility space. Similar to Scenarios I and II, consumers losing the most from the increased 
rg  are those consuming the reference product both before and after the change in rg  
(i.e., consumers with 
' '( , ]),ls rg   followed by consumers who find it optimal to turn 
away from the reference product (i.e., consumers with 
' "( , ]rg rg    and 
'( , ]).ls ls    
Unlike Scenarios I and II, however, consumers who prefer the substitute product before 
and after the increase in rg (i.e., consumers with ( ,1])rg  gain, as do some of the 
reference product consumers switching to the substitute (i.e., consumers with 
"( , ]),rg rg   with the magnitude of this gain determined by the differentiating 
attribute of these consumers. Consumer gains and losses in this case are given by  
''
1
' '( ) ( )
rg
rg rg
c hs rg hs hsG U U d U U d

 
       and 
' "'
' '
'( ) ( ) ( )
rg rgls
ls ls rg
t
c rg ls rg rg rg hsL U U d U U d U U d
 
  
          , respectively.  
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Figure II.2.9.  Total Effects of Increased rg on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
           under Scenario III 
 
In addition to affecting the decisions and welfare of consumers and producers of the 
substitute product, the changes in chsp  and 
f
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the reference product rgD upwards (downwards), while an increase (decrease) in 
f
hsp  
causes an upward (downward) shift of the supply of the reference product rgS (recall 
equations (I.8) and (I.18) and Figures I.3 and I.5). The total effects of the increased rg  
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Finally, regarding the impact of the increased rg on the markets for the inputs used in 
the production of the reference product and its substitute, no matter the effect of the 
change on chsp  and
f
hsp , the increased rg reduces the demand for inputs used in the 
production of the reference product (as the equilibrium quantity of this product falls in 
the presence of increased market power; see equation (I.30)) and increases the demand 
for inputs used in the production of the substitute (so that the increased production of this 
product in the presence of increased rg can be facilitated).  
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Figure II.2.10.  Overall Impact of the Increased rg on the rg Market  
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The reduced equilibrium price and quantity of the inputs used in the production of 
the reference product result in reduced profits for the suppliers of these inputs, while the 
increased price and quantity of the inputs used in the production of the substitute increase 
the profits of the suppliers of these inputs. The change in the profits of the rg input 
suppliers is given by ' '( ) ( ) 0I I Irg rg rg rg rg rg rgw c x w c x        
, while the change in the 
profits of the hs input suppliers is ' '( ) ( ) 0I I Ihs hs hs hs hs hs hsw c x w c x      . The market and 
welfare effects of the increased rg on the input markets are depicted in Figure II.2.11.  
 
 
Figure II.2.11.  Increased rg Impact on the Input Markets 
 
Overall, the analysis of the system-wide market and welfare impacts of an increased rg  
indicates that: (a) the qualitative nature of the welfare effects on the consumers and 
producers of the substitute product is scenario-specific and depends on the conditions in 
the market for both the reference product and the substitute product; (b) the impacts of the 
increased market power of middlemen are asymmetric across the different consumers and 
producers affected by this increase; (c) determination of these asymmetric impacts 
requires a disaggregation of the benefits and costs to the level of the individual agent; and 
(d) in Scenarios I and III, some of the consumers (Scenario III) or some of the producers 
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(Scenario I) who find it optimal to switch from the reference product to its substitute after 
the increase in rg realize welfare gains. 
Table II.2.1 summarizes the asymmetric effects of increased rg on the welfare 
of all relevant interest groups, while Figures II.2.12-II.2.14 summarize the system-wide 
market and welfare impacts of the increase in rg under the different scenarios 
considered in this study. For simplicity, the feedback effect on the rg market (depicted in 
Figure II.2.10) is not included in Figures II.2.12- II.2.14.  
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Table II.2.1.  System-Wide Welfare Impacts of Increased Market Power of Middlemen, rg  
 Consumers 
of rg 
switching   
to ls 
Consumers 
of rg 
Consumers 
of rg 
switching   
to hs 
Consumers 
of hs 
Producers  
of rg 
Producers  
of rg 
switching   
to hs 
Producers  
of hs 
Suppliers   
of rg 
Suppliers   
of hs 
Input 
Suppliers   
rg 
Input 
Suppliers   
hs 
Scenario  
I 
– – – – – some +  
some – 
+ – + – + 
Scenario 
II 
– – – – – – – – + – + 
Scenario 
III 
– – some –  
some + 
+ – – – – + – + 
+    denotes welfare gains 
–    denotes welfare losses 
 
Condition for Scenario I: 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
 
Condition for Scenario II: 
(1 )( ) ( )
( ) (1 )( )
s b
f c fhs hs
rg rg hs rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p w w p p w w
      
      
   
                     
 
Condition for Scenario III: 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
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Figure II.2.12.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of Increased rg under Scenario I 
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Figure II.2.13.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of Increased rg under Scenario II 
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Figure II.2.14.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of Increased rg under Scenario III 
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Disaggregation of Welfare Changes and Comparison with Conventional Analysis 
The conclusions outlined above are important because they indicate that a proper 
accounting of the differential welfare impacts of an increase in rg requires a 
disaggregated analysis, particularly in Scenarios I and III where some of the consumers 
(Scenario III) or some of the producers (Scenario I) of the reference product realize 
welfare gains after they have optimally switched. As was pointed out earlier in the book, 
the aggregate welfare changes can be determined using the calculation of producer and 
consumer surplus from the supply and demand curves. As will be shown in this section, 
however, the proper allocation of these surplus changes to different consumers and 
producers requires an additional disaggregation.  
To illustrate the issues involved in properly disaggregating the welfare changes, 
consider Scenario III where the consumer price of the reference good increases and the 
consumer price of the substitute good falls (a similar analysis could be undertaken for 
producers in Scenario I). Figure II.2.15 (which is the same as Figure II.2.9) shows the 
utility curves for the reference and substitute goods with the welfare changes 
disaggregated. The solid lines show the utility curves before the increase in rg , while 
the dotted lines show the utility curves after the prices have taken their new equilibrium 
values as a result of the increase in middlemen market power.  
Figure II.2.16 shows the demand curves derived from the utility curves (these 
demand curves were presented earlier in Figure I.3). Before rg is increased, the 
consumer price of the reference good is c
rgp , while the consumer price of the substitute 
good is
c
hsp . The corresponding quantities purchased are rgx  and hsx . The increase in 
rg  raises the consumer price of the reference good to 
'
rg
cp . This increased price, in turn, 
shifts out the demand curve for the substitute product from ( )
c
hs rgD p  to 
'( ).chs rgD p  
Recall that the price of the substitute product falls because of the shift out of the supply 
curve (not shown here; see Figure II.2.5, panel 3) – the resulting equilibrium price is 
'c
hsp . 
At this price, consumption of the substitute good is 
'
hsx . The fall in the price of the 
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substitute good causes the demand curve for the reference good to shift downward from 
( )crg hsD p  to 
'( )crg hsD p . Given price 
'
rg
cp , consumption of the reference good is 'rgx .  
As shown in Figure II.2.15, the increase in rg results in a loss of area a for the 
consumers located between ls  and 
'
ls  that exit the market of the reference product, 
and a loss of area b to those that continue to purchase the reference good (those located 
between 
'
ls  and 
'
rg ). Of those that switch to the high quality substitute good, some lose 
(those located between '
rg  and 
''
rg ; the magnitude of the loss is area c plus area d) while 
some benefit (those located between ''
rg  and rg ; the magnitude of the gain is area m). 
Finally, the consumers that originally purchased the high quality substitute gain (these 
consumers are located between 
rg  and 1; the size of the gain is area n). At the aggregate 
level, the welfare change is thus (m + n) - (a + b + c + d). 
 
 
Total consumer welfare change:  (m + n) - (a + b + c + d) 
rg consumers that switch to hs: - some gain (area m) 
- some lose (area c + d) 
rg consumers net gain = m - (a + b + c + d) 
hs consumers net gain = n 
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Figure II.2.15.  Consumer Welfare Impacts of Increased rg under Scenario III:  
 Consumer Utility Space 
- 68 - 
 
 
 
These aggregate welfare changes can also be obtained from the demand curves presented 
in Figure II.2.16 (the various welfare areas have been labeled so that they match the 
utility areas in Figure II.2.15). As noted earlier, there are two methods of calculating the 
welfare change. The first method is to calculate the overall change in consumer surplus 
(denote this as 1CS ) given by the change in consumer surplus in the reference market 
evaluated at the new equilibrium price of the substitute good, plus the change in 
consumer surplus in the substitute market evaluated at the original price of the reference 
good. The second method is to calculate the aggregate change in consumer surplus 
(denote this as 2CS ) as the change in consumer surplus in the reference market 
evaluated at the original price of the substitute good, plus the change in consumer surplus 
in the substitute market evaluated at the new equilibrium price of the reference good (see 
Thurman (1991)).  
 
 
Figure II.2.16.  Consumer Welfare Impacts of Increased rg under Scenario III:  
 Price-Quantity Space   
 
Using the first method, the overall change in consumer surplus 1CS  is given by: 
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The above expression allocates a loss of utility equal to (a + b + c + d) to the reference 
market and a gain in utility equal to (m + n) to the substitute market. However, while the 
aggregate change is correct, the allocation to the two markets is neither correct nor 
particularly insightful. While most of the original consumers of the reference good lose 
utility – this amount is equal to area (a + b + c + d) – there are some of these consumers 
that gain; this gain is given by area m. As well, the original consumers of the substitute 
product gain an amount equal to area n. Allocating the cost and benefits according to the 
demand curves in each market overstates the benefits to those that originally consumed 
the substitute product and overstates the costs to those that originally consumed the 
reference product. In short, the calculation of consumer surplus from the demand curves 
does not provide a proper allocation of the costs and benefits to the various consumer 
groups.   
A similar problem emerges if the second method is used. Using this method, the 
aggregate change in consumer surplus 2CS is: 
 
'
'
'
2CS ( , ) ( , )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
rg hs
c
rg hs
c c
c
p p
c
rg rg h
c
hs hs rg hs rg
p p
sx p p dp x p p dp
a b c d h i j m n h i j
a b c d m n
   
            
      
 
     
While calculation of the welfare change in this way also yields the correct measure of the 
aggregate welfare change, it also overstates both the loss in the reference market and the 
gain in the substitute market. While these overstated amounts cancel each other out at the 
aggregate level, they yield incorrect results if they are used to determine the distributional 
impacts of a middlemen market power increase.  
The need to disaggregate the consumer surplus measures is clearly important in 
Scenario III, since in this scenario some consumers gain and others lose from the increase 
in rg . However, if it is believed that the magnitude of the loss felt by consumers is also 
important (as would be the case if consumers exhibit loss aversion, for instance), then 
disaggregating the losses that occur in Scenarios I and II may also be required as the 
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effects of the increased rg were shown to vary among consumers.
11 The same 
conclusions, of course, can be drawn regarding the need to disaggregate producer 
welfare. In this case, there is a clear need to disaggregate producer welfare in Scenario I, 
since in this case the producer price of the substitute good rises and some of the 
producers that switch to producing the substitute good will be better off than they were 
originally in producing the reference product. There may also be a need to disaggregate 
the changes in producer welfare in Scenarios II and III, since, as was shown in the 
previous sections, the welfare changes are not symmetric among producers.   
 
 
  
                                                          
11 With loss aversion, consumers are risk averse in the domain of gain and risk loving in the 
domain of loss (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). One of the implications of the risk loving 
behavior in the loss domain is that, to restore the loss they have incurred, consumers that have lost 
more will be more likely to engage in activities with an uncertain outcome. Thus, identifying those 
consumers that have lost the most may be important in determining who will be the most likely to 
undertake activities to oppose a middlemen market power increase. 
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II.3 Increased Market Power of Input Suppliers            
The focus of this section is on the determination of the system-wide market and welfare 
impacts of increased market power of suppliers of the inputs used in the production of the 
reference product (increased 
I
rg , hereafter). Once the effects of the increased 
I
rg on the 
market where it occurs have been determined (i.e., the input market for the reference 
product), we proceed in discussing its impacts on the vertically, horizontally and 
diagonally related markets and interest groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, 
middlemen and input suppliers in the supply channels of the reference good and its 
substitute products).  
 
Equilibrium Conditions under an Increased 𝜽𝒓𝒈
𝑰    
An increase in the market power of the suppliers of the inputs used in the production of the 
reference product, 
I
rg , results in an increased price of these inputs. Graphically, the 
increased 
I
rg  can be depicted as increasing the slope of the effective marginal revenue 
curve faced by the input suppliers in the reference product supply channel, and, 
subsequently, the price of this input from rgw  to 
'
rgw  in Figure II.3.1  
 
Figure II.3.1.  Increased Market Power of Input Suppliers 
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In addition to increasing the price of the reference input, the increased 
I
rg  results in 
reduced equilibrium quantity (compare rgx  and 
'
rgx  in Figure II.3.1) and greater profits 
for the suppliers of this input.                
Besides affecting the market for the reference input, the increased 
I
rg  has an 
effect on (vertically, horizontally and diagonally) related markets and our integrated 
framework of analysis can help identify the system-wide market and welfare impacts of 
this change. The equilibrium conditions/market reaction functions under the increased 
I
rg  can be derived by substituting 
'I
rg  for 
I
rg  in equations (I.24)-(I.31). As mentioned 
earlier, the nature of the interdependence of markets captured by these expressions 
provide, along with the related graphical representation, valuable insights on the 
mechanism through which the increased 
I
rg  affects the different markets. The rest of 
this section discusses the market and welfare impacts of the increased 
I
rg  using the 
integrated heterogeneous agent framework presented in Section I. 
 
System-Wide Market and Welfare Effects of an Increased 𝜽𝒓𝒈
𝑰    
The analysis in this part focuses on the impact of the increased 
I
rg  on the input and 
output markets for the reference product and its substitute, as well as its effects on the 
welfare of all interest groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, middlemen and input 
suppliers in the markets for the two products). In addition to determining changes in the 
aggregate consumer and producer welfare, our integrated heterogeneous agent framework 
enables us to (a) determine the effects of the increased 
I
rg  on different consumers and 
producers of the two products and (b) capture indirect and feedback effects that are not 
accounted for when focusing solely on the market of the reference input.  
Beginning with the direct producer effects of the increased 
I
rg , we see that the 
increase in the price of the reference input, ,rgw  (a) reduces the net returns associated 
with the production of the product utilizing this input in its production process (i.e., the 
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reference product), and (b) drives previous producers of the reference product to the 
substitute and alternative crops. Graphically, the increase in rgw causes a downward 
parallel shift of rgNR and the switching of producers with differentiating attributes 
'( , ]hs hsA A A  and 
'( , ]rg rgA A A  in Figure II.3.2 to the substitute and alternative crops, 
respectively.  
 
 
Figure II.3.2.  Direct Effects of an Increased 
I
rg  on Producer Decisions  
 
The reduced appeal of the reference product due to its increased input costs reduces the 
supply of the reference product and, through this, increases the consumer and producer 
prices of this product (see equations (I.24) and (I.25)). Figure II.3.3 graphs the upward 
parallel shift of rgS and consequent decrease in rgx and increases in 
c
rgp and 
f
rgp  due to 
the increased .
I
rg  
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Figure II.3.3.  Direct Effects of an Increased 
I
rg  on the Oligemporistic rg Market   
Moving to the direct consumer effects of the increased 
I
rg , we see that the increase in 
the consumer price of the reference product (a) reduces the utility associated with the 
consumption of this product and (b) drives some of the consumers of the reference  
product to its substitutes. Graphically, the increase in 
c
rgp causes an downward parallel 
shift of rgU and the switching of consumers with differentiating attributes 
'( , ]ls ls    
and 
'( , ]rg rg    in Figure II.3.4 to ls and hs substitute products, respectively.  
 
 
Figure II.3.4.  Direct Effects of an Increased 
I
rg  on Consumption Decisions  
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In addition to affecting the market for the reference product, the changes in this market 
caused by the increased 
I
rg  have a direct impact on the market for the substitute product. 
In particular, the increased consumer and input prices of the reference product due to the 
higher 
I
rg  drive a number of consumers and producers out of the market for the 
reference product affecting, this way, both the demand for and supply of the substitute 
product.  
Formally, the increased 
c
rgp  causes an upward parallel shift of the demand for 
the substitute product, hsD  (see equation (I.9) and Figure II.3.6), while the increased rgw  
and 
f
rgp  cause a downward parallel shift of the supply of the substitute product, hsS  (see 
equation (I.19) and Figure II.3.6). While the increased demand for, and supply of the 
substitute product always increase the equilibrium quantity and profits of the suppliers of 
this product, the effect on the equilibrium consumer and producer prices ( chsp  and 
f
hsp , 
respectively) is determined by the relative magnitude of the demand and supply effects of 
the increased 
I
rg  on the market for the substitute product. In particular, since a ceteris 
paribus increase in Dhs causes 
c
hsp  and 
f
hsp  to increase, while a similar increase in hsS
results in reduced chsp  and 
f
hsp , when the demand effect dominates the supply effect so 
that 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp w p w
     
 
   
        
 (where, as noted above, 
0,crgp  0
f
rgp  and 0rgw  , while, as shown in Figure II.3.12 below, 0hsw  ), the 
consumer and producer prices of the substitute product increase after the increase in 
I
rg
(Scenario I); when 
( ) (1 )( )
(1 )( ) ( )
f c
rg rg hs rgs b
hs hs
s b
fhs hs
rg rg hs
w p w p
w p w
 
     
     
 

            
   
       
, 
the consumer price of the substitute product increases while the producer price falls 
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(Scenario II); while when the supply effect of the increased 
I
rg  dominates the demand 
effect so that 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p w p w
 
     

           
, the increase of 
I
rg  causes the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product to fall (Scenario 
III). Figure II.3.5 provides a graphical representation of the conditions leading to the 
three scenarios while panels 1, 2 and 3 of Figure II.3.6 graph the effects of the increased 
I
rg  on the market of the substitute product under these three scenarios.  
It is important to note that for Scenario II to occur, the middlemen in the 
substitute product market should be able to exercise market power. If 0s bhs hs   , the 
condition for Scenario I becomes 
c f
rg rg rg hsp w p w
 
 

        
 and the condition 
for Scenario III becomes 
c f
rg rg rg hsp w p w
 
 

        
. Intuitively, under perfectly 
competitive middlemen in the substitute product market, the consumer and producer 
prices of this product will always move in the same direction. While the presence of 
middlemen market power is necessary for the consumer and producer prices of the 
substitute product to move in different directions, it is not sufficient for the emergence of 
Scenario II – as shown above, both Scenarios I and III can emerge in the presence of 
middlemen market power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.3.5.  Scenarios on the Effects of Increased 
I
rg  on the Prices of Substitute hs Product 
 
Figure II.2.4.  Effects of Fat Tax on Market for Substitute hs Product 
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Since the equilibrium prices of the substitute product affect the welfare of the consumers 
and producers of this product, our analysis considers the market and welfare impacts of 
the increased 
I
rg  under the three scenarios outlined above. The case where the increase 
in 
I
rg  causes the consumer and producer prices of its substitute product to increase (i.e., 
the case in which the demand effect dominates the supply effect of the increased 
I
rg ) is 
analyzed first followed by the other two scenarios considered here. In all cases, suppliers 
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of the substitute product see their profits increase after the increase in 
I
rg by 
' ' ' ' '( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0.c c c f f fhs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hsp p x p p x x p p x             
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Increase in 
I
rg  𝜽𝒓𝒈
𝑰  under Scenario I  
(i.e., when 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp w p w
     
 
   
        
) 
As mentioned previously, when the demand effect of the increased 
I
rg  dominates its 
supply effect, the increase in 
I
rg  increases the consumer and producer prices of its 
substitute product (recall panel 1 of Figure II.3.6 that depicts this scenario in the price-
quantity space).  
The increased consumer price of the substitute product, chsp , reduces the utility 
associated with the consumption of this product and limits the number of consumers of 
the reference product switching to the substitute. Figure II.3.7 depicts these market and 
welfare effects in the consumer utility space. In addition, the figure shows that the 
consumers hurt the most from the increased 
I
rg  are those consuming the reference 
product both before and after the increase in 
I
rg  (i.e., consumers with 
' '( , ]),ls rg  
followed by consumers who find it optimal to turn away from the reference product (i.e., 
consumers with 
'( , ]rg rg    and 
'( , ]),ls ls   and consumers who consume the 
substitute before and after the increase in 
I
rg  (i.e., consumers with ( ,1]).rg   Total 
consumer losses from the increased 
I
rg  are given by 
''
' '
1
' ' '( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
rg rgls
ls ls rg rg
c rg ls rg rg rg hs hs hsL U U d U U d U U d U U d
 
   
              . 
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Figure II.3.7.  Total Effects of Increased 
I
rg  on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
           under Scenarios I & II 
 
While the increased 
c
hsp  reduces the desirability of the substitute product for consumers, 
the increased 
f
hsp  under Scenario I increases the net returns associated with the 
production of the substitute product and, thus, increases the incentives for switching to 
the production of this product. Figure II.3.8 depicts these market and welfare effects as 
well as the asymmetric impacts of the increased 
I
rg  in the producer net returns space. 
Producers losing the most from the increased 
I
rg  are those producing the reference 
product both before and after the increase in 
I
rg  (i.e., producers with 
' '( , ]),hs rgA A A
followed by producers who find it optimal to switch from the reference product to the 
alternative crop (i.e., producers with 
'( , ]),rg rgA A A and the producers with 
'' '( , ]hs hsA A A  who switch from the reference product to the substitute.  
Producers who produce the substitute before and after the increase in 
I
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switch to the substitute (i.e., producers with ''( , )),hs hsA A A with the magnitude of this 
gain determined by the efficiency parameter/differentiating attribute of these producers.  
Producer gains and losses in this case are given by 
''
' '
0
( ) ( )
hs hs
hs
A A
p hs hs hs rg
A
G NR NR dA NR NR dA      and 
''
'' ' '
' '( ) ( ) ( )
rg rghs
hs hs rg
A AA
p rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
L NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA        , respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure II.3.8.  Total Effects of Increased 
I
rg  on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
           under Scenario I 
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Increase in 
I
rg under Scenario II (i.e., when 
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   
       
) 
As shown in panel 2 of Figure II.3.6, under Scenario II the consumer price of the 
substitute product increases while the producer price falls causing both consumers and 
producers of this product to lose.  
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 Predictably, the ramifications of the increased 
I
rg  for the consumers of the 
different products are similar to those under Scenario I (described in the previous section 
and graphed in Figure II.3.7), as chsp  increases under both Scenarios I and II. Thus, the 
increased 
I
rg  under Scenario II hurts all reference and substitute product consumers 
with the greater losses incurred by those consumers who buy the reference product both 
before and after the increase in 
I
rg . 
 Unlike Scenario I, producers of the substitute product lose under Scenario II as 
the increased 
I
rg  causes the producer price of the substitute product, 
f
hsp , to fall. The 
reduced fhsp  reduces the net returns associated with the production of this product and 
limits the number of producers who find it optimal to switch to the substitute product 
after the increase in 
I
rg  (recall that the increased rgw  creates incentives for a number of 
producers of the reference product to switch to the production of the substitute and 
alternative crops; see Figure II.3.2).  
Figure II.3.9 depicts these market and welfare effects in the producer net returns 
space. In addition, the figure shows that the producers losing the most from the increased 
I
rg  are those producing the reference product both before and after the increase in 
I
rg
(i.e., producers with 
' '( , ]),hs rgA A A followed by producers who switch from the 
reference to the alternative and substitute crops (i.e., producers with 
'( , ]rg rgA A A and 
'( , ]),hs hsA A A and producers who continue to produce the substitute product after the 
increase in 
I
rg (i.e., producers with [0, ]).hsA A  Total producer losses from the 
increased 
I
rg  are  
''
' '
' ' '
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
rg rghs hs
hs hs rg
A AA A
p hs hs rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
L NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA            
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Figure II.3.9.  Total Effects of Increased 
I
rg  on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
           under Scenarios II & III 
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Increase in 
I
rg under Scenario III  
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) 
When the supply effect of the increased 
I
rg dominates the demand effect, the increased 
I
rg  causes the consumer and producer prices of the substitute good to fall. While the 
effects of the reduced 
f
hsp  on producer decisions and welfare are similar to those under 
Scenario II (described in the previous section and graphed in Figure II.3.9), the effects of 
the increased 
I
rg  on consumers are different than those under Scenarios I and II. 
 Specifically, the reduced chsp  increases the utility associated with the 
consumption of the substitute product and increases the number of consumers switching 
from the reference product. Figure II.3.10 depicts these market and welfare effects as 
well as the asymmetric impacts of the increased 
I
rg  on consumer welfare in the 
consumer utility space. Similar to Scenarios I and II, consumers losing the most from the 
increased 
I
rg  are those consuming the reference product both before and after the 
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increase in 
I
rg  (i.e., consumers with 
' '( , ]),ls rg   followed by consumers who find 
it optimal to turn away from the reference product (i.e., consumers with 
' "( , ]rg rg  
and '( , ]).ls ls   Unlike Scenarios I and II, however, consumers who prefer the 
substitute product before and after the increase in 
I
rg  (i.e., consumers with 
( ,1])rg  gain, as do some of the reference product consumers who switch to the 
substitute (i.e., consumers with 
''( , ]),rg rg   with the magnitude of this gain  
determined by the differentiating attribute of these consumers. Consumer gains and 
losses in this case are given by 
''
1
' '( ) ( )
rg
rg rg
c hs rg hs hsG U U d U U d

 
       and 
' '''
' '
' '( ) ( ) ( )
rg rgls
ls ls rg
c rg ls rg rg rg hsL U U d U U d U U d
 
  
          , respectively.  
 
 
Figure II.3.10.  Total Effects of Increased 
I
rg  on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenario III 
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the reference product. In particular, an increase (decrease) in chsp  shifts the demand for the 
reference product Drg upwards (downwards), while an increase (decrease) in 
f
hsp  causes an 
upward (downward) shift of the supply of the reference product rgS (recall equations (I.8) 
and (I.18) and Figures I.3 and I.5). The total effects of the increased 
I
rg  under the three 
scenarios considered here are depicted in panels 1-3 of Figure II.3.11. In all cases, the 
increased 
I
rg  causes a reduction in the reference product supplier profits with the change 
in profits given by ' ' ' ' '( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0c c c f f frg rg rg rg rg rg rg rg rg rg rgp p x p p x x p p x           
. 
 
  
 
Figure II.3.11.  Overall Impact of the Increased 
I
rg  on the rg Market  
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Regarding the impact of the increased 
I
rg  on the market for the inputs used in the 
production of the substitute product, no matter the effect of the change on chsp  and ,
f
hsp  
the increase in 
I
rg  increases the demand for inputs used in the production of its 
substitute (as the equilibrium quantity of the substitute product increases as a result of the 
increase in 
I
rg ). The increased demand for hs inputs results, then, in higher equilibrium 
input price and quantity (see equations (I.29) and (I.31)), and an increase in the profits of 
the suppliers of these inputs given by ' '( ) ( ) 0I I Ihs hs hs hs hs hs hsw c x w c x      . Figure 
II.3.12, panel b graphs the changes in the market for the input used in the production of 
the substitute product due to the increased .
I
rg  
 
 
 
Figure II.3.12.  Total Effect of an Increase in 
I
rg  on the Input Markets  
 
Finally, the change in hsw  has a feedback effect on the market of the reference input. 
Specifically, the increase in hsw  increases the demand for the reference input 
I
rgD (see 
equation (I.20) and Figure I.6) which, in turn, (a) bolsters the impact of the increased 
I
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on the price of this input, and (b) lessens its impact on the quantity of the subsidized input 
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(see equations (I.28) and (I.30)). The total effects of the increased 
I
rg on the input 
markets are depicted in Figure II.3.12.  
Overall, the analysis of the system-wide market and welfare impacts of increased 
I
rg  indicates that: (a) the qualitative nature of the welfare effects on the consumers and 
producers of the substitute product is scenario-specific and depends on the conditions in 
the market for both the reference product and the substitute product; (b) the impacts of the 
increased market power of input suppliers are asymmetric across the different consumers 
and producers affected by this increase; (c) determination of these asymmetric impacts 
requires a disaggregation of the benefits and costs to the level of the individual agent; and 
(d) in Scenarios I and III, some of the consumers (Scenario III) or some of the producers 
(Scenario I) who find it optimal to switch from the reference product to its substitute after 
the increase in 
I
rg  realize welfare gains.  
The asymmetric impact of the increase in 
I
rg  on the welfare of all relevant 
interest groups is summarized in Table II.3.1, while Figures II.3.13-II.3.15 summarize the 
system-wide market and welfare impacts of the increased 
I
rg  under the different 
scenarios considered in this study. For simplicity, the feedback effects described above 
(Figures II.3.11 and II.3.12) are not included in Figures II.3.13-II.3.15.  
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Table II.3.1.  System-Wide Welfare Impacts of an Increase in Input Supplier Market Power, 
I
rg  
 Consumers 
of rg 
switching   
to ls 
Consumers 
of rg 
Consumers 
of rg 
switching   
to hs 
Consumers 
of hs 
Producers  
of rg 
Producers  
of rg 
switching   
to hs 
Producers  
of hs 
Suppliers   
of rg 
Suppliers   
of hs 
Input 
Suppliers   
rg 
Input 
Suppliers   
hs 
Scenario  
I 
– – – – – some +  
some – 
+ – + + + 
Scenario 
II 
– – – – – – – – + + + 
Scenario 
III 
– – some –  
some + 
+ – – – – + + + 
+    denotes welfare gains 
–    denotes welfare losses 
 
Condition for Scenario I: 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp w p w
     
 
   
        
  
Condition for Scenario II: 
(1 )( ) ( )
( ) (1 )( )
s b
f c fhs hs
rg rg hs rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
w p w p w p w
      
      
   
                     
  
Condition for Scenario III: 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p w p w
 
     

           
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Figure II.3.13.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of Increased 
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rg  under Scenario I 
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Figure II.3.14.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of Increased 
I
rg  under Scenario II 
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Figure II.3.15.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of Increased 
I
rg  under Scenario III 
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Disaggregation of Welfare Changes and Comparison with Conventional Analysis 
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that the key findings of the analysis 
outlined above are important because they indicate that a proper accounting of the 
differential welfare impacts of an increase in 
I
rg  requires a disaggregated analysis, 
particularly in Scenarios I and III where some of the consumers (Scenario III) or some of 
the producers (Scenario I) of the reference product realize welfare gains after they have 
optimally switched. While, as was pointed out earlier in the book, the aggregate welfare 
changes can be determined using the calculation of producer and consumer surplus from 
the supply and demand curves, the allocation of the welfare changes to the two markets is 
incorrect.  
Following the same approach developed in the case of the increased rg in 
Section II.2 (as in both cases the changes in the consumer prices of the different products 
are qualitatively the same), it can be shown that, similar to the case of increased rg  
Scenario III, allocating the costs and benefits according to the demand curves in each 
market overstates the benefits to those that originally consumed the substitute product 
and overstates the costs to those that originally consumed the reference product (i.e., 
overstates both the loss in the reference market and the gain in the substitute market). In 
short, the calculation of consumer surplus from the demand curves does not provide a 
proper allocation of the costs and benefits to the various consumer groups. While these 
overstated amounts cancel each other out at the aggregate level, they yield incorrect 
results if they are used to determine the distributional impacts of an increase in input 
supplier market power.  
The need to disaggregate the consumer surplus measures is clearly important in 
Scenario III, since in this scenario some consumers gain and others lose from the increase 
in .
I
rg  However, if it is believed that the magnitude of the loss felt by consumers is also 
important (as would be the case if consumers exhibit loss aversion, for instance), then 
disaggregating the losses that occur in Scenarios I and II may also be required as the 
effects of the increased 
I
rg  were shown to vary among consumers. The same 
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conclusions, of course, can be drawn regarding the need to disaggregate producer 
welfare. In this case, there is a clear need to disaggregate producer welfare in Scenario I, 
since in this case the producer price of the substitute good rises and some of the 
producers that switch to producing the substitute good will be better off than they were 
originally in producing the reference product. There may also be a need to disaggregate 
the changes in producer welfare in Scenarios II and III, since, as was shown in the 
previous sections, the welfare changes are not symmetric among producers.   
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II.4. Changes in Cost Structure             
Consider now the market and welfare impacts of a reduction in the costs faced by the 
suppliers of the inputs used in the production of the reference product. Such cost 
reduction can be the outcome of firm strategies (like adoption of cost-reducing 
technologies and process innovation activities and synergies from mergers and 
acquisitions), government policies (like input and R&D subsidies), or/and changes in the 
market conditions affecting the cost structure of the input suppliers.  
To determine the system-wide market and welfare impacts of a reduction in the 
costs faced by the input suppliers in the supply channel of interest, we compare and 
contrast the equilibrium prices, quantities, and welfare of the interest groups involved 
before and after the cost reduction. With the initial equilibrium conditions derived in 
Section I (and graphed in Figure I.9), our focus here is on the (system-wide) equilibrium 
conditions under the cost reduction. Once the effects of the cost reduction on the market 
where it is introduced have been determined (i.e., the input market for the reference 
product), we proceed in discussing its impacts on the vertically, horizontally and 
diagonally related markets and interest groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, 
middlemen and input suppliers in the supply channels of the reference good and its 
substitute products).  
 
Equilibrium Conditions under Reduced Input Supplier Costs  
The reduction in the costs faced by the input suppliers results in a reduction in the price 
of the input that is dependent on the degree of market power possessed/exercised by the 
suppliers of this input. Graphically, the cost reduction can be depicted as creating a 
downward parallel shift of the marginal cost schedule faced by the (imperfectly 
competitive) suppliers of the reference input, and a subsequent reduction in the price of 
this input from rgw  to 
'
rgw  in Figure II.4.1.  
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Figure II.4.1.  Cost-Reduction in an (Imperfectly Competitive) Input Market 
 
In addition to reducing the price of the reference input, the cost reduction results in 
increased equilibrium quantity (compare rgx  and 
'
rgx  in Figure II.4.1) and greater profits 
for the suppliers of this input (as the cost reduction exceeds the reduction in rgw ).                
Besides affecting the market for the reference input, this cost reduction has an 
effect on the vertically, horizontally and diagonally related markets and our integrated 
framework of analysis can help identify the system-wide market and welfare impacts of 
this change. The equilibrium conditions/market reaction functions in the presence of the 
cost reduction can be derived by substituting 
'I
rgc  for 
I
rgc  in equations (I.24)-( I.31). As 
mentioned earlier, the nature of the interdependence of markets captured by these 
expressions provide, along with the related graphical representation, valuable insights on 
the mechanism through which the reduced 
I
rgc  affects the different markets. The section 
below discusses the market and welfare impacts of the reduced 
I
rgc  using the integrated 
heterogeneous agent framework presented in Section I. 
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System-Wide Market and Welfare Effects of a Cost Reduction  
The analysis in this part focuses on the impact of the cost reduction on the input and 
output markets for the reference product and its substitute, as well as its effects on the 
welfare of all interest groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, middlemen and input 
suppliers in the markets for the two products). In addition to determining changes in the 
aggregate consumer and producer welfare, our integrated heterogeneous agent framework 
enables us to (a) determine the effects of the cost reduction on different consumers and 
producers of the two products and (b) capture indirect and feedback effects that are not 
accounted for when focusing solely on the market of the reference input.  
Beginning with the direct producer effects of the cost reduction, we see that the 
reduction in the price of the reference input, rgw , (a) increases the net returns associated 
with the production of the reference product and (b) attracts to the reference product 
previous producers of substitute and alternative crops. Graphically, the reduction in rgw
causes an upward parallel shift of NRrg and the switching of producers with differentiating 
attributes '( , ]hs hsA A A and 
'( , ]rg rgA A A  in Figure II.4.2 to the reference product.  
 
 
Figure II.4.2.  Direct Effects of a Cost Reduction on Producer Decisions  
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The increased appeal of the reference product due to its reduced input costs increases the 
supply of the reference product and, through this, reduces the consumer and producer 
prices of this product (see equations (I.24), (I.25) and (I.30)). Figure II.4.3 graphs the 
downward parallel shift of rgS and consequent increase in rgx  and reductions in 
c
rgp  and 
f
rgp  due to the cost reduction. 
 
 
Figure II.4.3.  Direct Effects of a Cost Reduction on the Oligemporistic rg Market   
 
Moving to the direct consumer effects of the cost reduction, we see that the reduction in 
the consumer price of the reference product (a) increases the utility associated with the 
consumption of this product and (b) attracts previous consumers of substitute products to 
the reference good. Graphically, the reduction in 
c
rgp  causes an upward parallel shift of 
rgU  and the switching of consumers with differentiating attributes 
'( , ]ls ls    and 
'( , ]rg rg    in Figure II.4.4 to the reference product.  
 
0
rgD
rgp
rgx
rgS
"" rgMO
f
rgp
"" 'rgMO
rgx
c
rgp '
rgS
"" rgMR
'f
rgp
'
rgx
'c
rgp
- 97 - 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.4.4.  Direct Effects of a Cost Reduction on Consumption Decisions  
 
In addition to affecting the market for the reference product, the changes in this market 
caused by the cost reduction have a direct impact on the market for the substitute product. 
The reduced consumer price and the increased returns to the production of the reference 
product in the presence of the cost reduction attract to the reference product previous 
consumers and producers of the substitute, affecting, this way, both the demand for and 
supply of the substitute product.  
Formally, the reduced 
c
rgp  causes a downward parallel shift of the demand for 
the substitute product, hsD  (see equation (I.9) and Figure II.4.6), while the reduced rgw
and 
f
rgp  cause an upward parallel shift of the supply of the substitute product, hsS  (as the 
reduction in rgw  exceeds that in 
f
rgp ; see equation (I.19) and Figure II.4.6). While the 
reduced demand for, and supply of the substitute product always reduce the equilibrium 
quantity and profits of the suppliers of this product, the effect on the equilibrium 
consumer and producer prices ( chsp  and 
f
hsp , respectively) is determined by the relative 
magnitude of the demand and supply effects of the cost reduction on the market for the 
substitute product. In particular, since a ceteris paribus decrease in hsD  causes 
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f
hsp  to fall, while a similar decrease in hsS  results in increased 
c
hsp  and 
f
hsp , when the 
supply effect dominates the demand effect so that 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
 (where, as noted above, 
0,crgp   0
f
rgp  and 0rgw  , while, as shown in Figure II.4.12 below, 0hsw  ), 
the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product increase after the cost 
reduction (Scenario I); when 
(1 )( ) ( )
,
( ) (1 )( )
s b
f c fhs hs
rg rg hs rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p w w p p w w
      
      
   
                     
 
the producer price of the substitute product increases while the consumer price falls 
(Scenario II); while when the demand effect of the cost reduction dominates the supply 
effect so that 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
, the cost reduction 
causes both the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product to fall (Scenario 
III). Figure II.4.5 provides a graphical representation of the conditions leading to the 
three scenarios while panels 1, 2 and 3 of Figure II.4.6 graph the effects of the cost 
reduction on the market of the substitute product under these three scenarios.  
It is important to note that for Scenario II to occur, the middlemen in the 
substitute product market should be able to exercise market power. If 0s bhs hs   , the 
condition for Scenario I becomes c frg rg rg hsp p w w
 
 

        
 and the condition for 
Scenario III becomes c frg rg rg hsp p w w
 
 

        
. Intuitively, under perfectly 
competitive middlemen in the substitute product market, the consumer and producer 
prices of this product will always move in the same direction. While the presence of 
middlemen market power is necessary for the consumer and producer prices of the 
substitute product to move in different directions, it is not sufficient for the emergence of 
Scenario II – as shown above, both Scenarios I and III can emerge in the presence of 
middlemen market power.  
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Figure II.4.6.  Effects of a Cost Reduction on the Market for the Substitute hs Product 
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Figure II.4.5.  Scenarios on the Effects of a Cost Reduction on Prices of Substitute hs Product 
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Since the equilibrium prices of the substitute product affect the welfare of the consumers 
and producers of this product, our analysis considers the market and welfare impacts of 
the cost reduction under the three scenarios outlined above. The case where the cost 
reduction in the market of the reference product causes the consumer and producer prices 
of its substitute product to increase (i.e., the case in which the supply effect dominates the 
demand effect of the cost reduction) is analyzed first followed by the two other scenarios 
considered here. In all cases, suppliers of the substitute product realize a reduction in 
profits, with the change given by:
' ' ' ' '( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0.c c f f c fhs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hsp p x p p x p p x x           
    
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Cost Reduction under Scenario I  
(i.e., when 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
) 
As mentioned previously, when the supply effect of a cost reduction dominates its 
demand effect, the cost reduction for the input suppliers of the reference product 
increases the consumer and producer prices of its substitute product (recall panel 1 of 
Figure II.4.6 that depicts this scenario in the price-quantity space).  
The increased consumer price of the substitute product, chsp , reduces the utility 
associated with the consumption of this product and further increases the number of 
consumers that find it optimal to switch their consumption to the reference product (see 
equation (I.30)). Figure II.4.7 depicts these market and welfare effects as well as the 
asymmetric impacts of the cost change on the welfare of consumers in the consumer 
utility space. In addition, the figure shows that the consumers benefiting the most from 
the cost reduction are those consuming the reference product both before and after the 
cost reduction (i.e., consumers with ( , ])ls rg    followed by consumers who find it 
optimal to switch to the reference product (i.e., consumers with '( , ]ls ls    and 
''( , )).rg rg    Consumers of the substitute product in the presence of the cost reduction 
(i.e., consumers with 
'( ,1])rg  as well as some consumers that find it optimal to 
switch their consumption from the substitute product to the reference good (i.e., 
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consumers with 
'' '( , ]rg rg    in Figure II.4.7) lose from the cost reduction, with the 
magnitude of their loss determined by their preference parameter/differentiating attribute 
α. The consumer gains and losses in this case are given by  
''
'
' ' '( ) ( ) ( )
rg rgls
s
ls ls rg
c rg ls rg rg rg hsG U U d U U d U U d
 
  
           and 
'
'' '
1
' '( ) ( )
rg
rg rg
c hs rg hs hsL U U d U U d

 
      , respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure II.4.7.  Total Effects of a Cost Reduction on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
           under Scenario I 
 
While the increased chsp  reduces the desirability of the substitute product for consumers, 
the increased fhsp  under Scenario I increases the net returns associated with the production 
of the substitute product and reduces the incentives for switching to the production of the 
reference product. Figure II.4.8 depicts these market and welfare effects in the producer 
net returns space. Producers benefiting the most from the cost reduction are those 
producing the reference product both before and after the introduction of the change in 
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switch to the reference product (i.e., producers with 
'( , ]rg rgA A A  and 
'( , ])hs hsA A A  and 
producers who continue to produce the substitute after the cost reduction (i.e., producers 
with '(0, ]).hsA A  Total producer benefits in this case are given by  
''
'
' ' ' '
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
rg rghs hs
hs hs rg
A AA A
p hs hs rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
G NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA            
 
 
Figure II.4.8.  Total Effects of a Cost Reduction on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
           under Scenarios I & II 
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Cost Reduction under Scenario II (i.e., when  
(1 )( ) ( )
( ) (1 )( )
s b
f c fhs hs
rg rg hs rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p w w p p w w
      
      
   
                     
) 
As shown in panel 2 of Figure II.4.6, under Scenario II the consumer price of the 
substitute product falls while the producer price increases making consumers and 
producers of the substitute product better off.  
 Predictably, the ramifications of the cost reduction for the producers of the 
different products are similar to those under Scenario I (described in the previous section 
and graphed in Figure II.4.8), as fhsp  increases under both Scenarios I and II. Thus, the 
'
rgA
hs
f
hs
wp 
0 1 
Differentiating Producer Attribute (A)
rgx
Net Returns 
'
hsA
hs
x
rg
f
rg wp 
rgAhsA
''
rg
f
rg wp 
''
hs
f
hs
wp 
'
rgx
'
hsx
- 103 - 
 
 
 
cost reduction under Scenario II benefits all reference and substitute product producers 
with the greater benefits enjoyed by those individuals who produce the reference product 
both before and after the cost reduction. 
 Unlike Scenario I, consumers of the substitute product gain under Scenario II as 
the cost reduction for the reference product input suppliers causes the consumer price of 
the substitute product, chsp , to fall. The reduced 
c
hsp  increases the utility associated with 
the consumption of this product and reduces the number of consumers who switch to the 
reference product (see equation (I.30)). Figure II.4.9 depicts these market and welfare 
effects in the consumer utility space. In addition, the figure shows that the consumers 
benefiting the most from the cost reduction are those consuming the reference product 
both before and after the cost reduction (i.e., consumers with ( , ]),ls rg   followed by 
consumers who find it optimal to switch to the reference product (i.e., consumers with 
'( , ]ls ls    and 
'( , ])rg rg    and consumers who continue to consume the 
substitute after the cost reduction (i.e., consumers with 
'( ,1]).rg  Total consumer 
benefits from the input suppliers’ cost reduction in this case are given by 
'
' '
1
' ' ' '( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
rg rgls
ls ls rg rg
c rg ls rg rg rg hs hs hsG U U d U U d U U d U U d
 
   
              . 
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Figure II.4.9.  Total Effects of a Cost Reduction on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
                         under Scenarios II & III  
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Market and Welfare Effects of a Cost Reduction under Scenario III  
(i.e., when 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
) 
When the demand effect of the cost reduction dominates the supply effect, a reduction in 
the cost faced by the suppliers of the inputs used in the production of the reference 
product causes the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product to fall. While 
the effects of the reduced chsp  on consumer decisions and welfare are similar to those 
under Scenario II (described in the previous section and graphed in Figure II.4.9), the 
effects of the cost reduction on producers are different than those under Scenarios I and II. 
 Specifically, the reduced fhsp  reduces the net returns associated with the 
production of the substitute product and increases the incentives for switching to the 
production of the reference product (see equation (I.30)). Figure II.4.10 depicts these 
market and welfare effects as well as the asymmetric impacts of the cost reduction on 
producer welfare in the producer net returns space. Producers benefiting the most from 
the cost reduction are those producing the reference product both before and after this 
change (i.e., producers with ( , ]),hs rgA A A  followed by producers who find it optimal to 
switch to the reference product from the alternative crop and the substitute product (i.e., 
producers with 
'( , ]rg rgA A A  and 
''( , ]).hs hsA A A  Producers who continue to produce the 
substitute after the cost reduction (i.e., producers with '(0, ])hsA A  lose, as do some of 
the substitute product producers who switch to the reference product (i.e., producers with  
' "( , )),hs hsA A A  with the magnitude of this loss determined by the efficiency  
parameter/differentiating attribute of these producers. The producer gains and losses in 
this case are given by
'
''
' ' '( ) ( ) ( )
rg rghs
hs hs rg
A AA
p rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
G NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA         
and 
' ''
'
' '
0
( ) ( )
hs hs
hs
A A
p hs hs hs rg
A
L NR NR dA NR NR dA     , respectively. 
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Figure II.4.10.  Total Effects of a Cost Reduction on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenario III 
 
In addition to affecting the decisions and welfare of consumers and producers of the 
substitute product, the changes in chsp  and 
f
hsp  have a feedback effect on the market for 
the reference product (recall equations (I.24), (I.25) and (I.30)). In particular, an increase 
(decrease) in chsp  shifts the demand for the reference product rgD upwards (downwards), 
while an increase (decrease) in fhsp  causes an upward (downward) shift of the supply of 
the reference product rgS (recall equations (I.8) and (I.18) and Figures I.3 and I.5). The 
total effects of the cost reduction on the final consumer market for the reference product 
under the three scenarios considered here are depicted in Figure II.4.11. In all cases, the 
cost reduction causes an increase in the reference product supplier profits with the change 
given by 
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Regarding the impact of the cost reduction in the market for the reference input on the 
inputs used in the production of the substitute product, no matter its effect on chsp  and ,
f
hsp  
the reduction in the costs faced by the suppliers of the inputs used in the production of the 
reference product reduces the demand for inputs used in the production of its substitute (as 
the equilibrium quantity of the substitute product falls after the cost reduction). The 
reduced demand for hs inputs results, then, in lower equilibrium input price and quantity 
(see equations (I.29) and (I.31)), and reduced profits of the supplier of these inputs, with 
the change in profits given by ' '( ) ( ) 0.I I Ihs hs hs hs hs hs hsw c x w c x        
 Figure II.4.12, 
panel b graphs the changes in the market for the input used in the production of the 
substitute product due to the cost reduction in the market for the reference input. 
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Figure II.4.11.  Overall Impact of the Cost Reduction on the rg Product Market  
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Figure II.4.12.  Total Effect of a Cost Reduction on the Input Markets  
 
Finally, the change in hsw  has a feedback effect on the market of the reference input. 
Specifically, the decrease in hsw  reduces the demand for the reference input 
I
rgD (see 
equation (I.20) and Figure I.6) which, in turn, (a) bolsters the impact of the cost reduction 
on the price of this input, and (b) lessens the impact of the cost change on the quantity of 
the reference input (see equations (I.28) and (I.30)). The total effects of the cost reduction 
on the input markets are depicted in Figure II.4.12.  
Overall, the analysis on the market and welfare effects of a cost reduction in the 
market of the input used in the production of the reference product indicates that: (a) the 
qualitative nature of the welfare effects on the consumers and producers of the substitute 
product is scenario-specific and depends on the conditions in the market for both the 
reference product and the substitute product; (b) the impacts of the reduced 
I
rgc  are 
asymmetric across the different consumers and producers affected by the cost reduction; 
(c) determination of these asymmetric impacts requires a disaggregation of the benefits 
and costs to the level of the individual agent; and (d) in Scenarios I and III, some of the 
consumers (Scenario I) or some of the producers (Scenario III) who find it optimal to 
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switch from the substitute product to the reference good after the decrease in 
I
rgc  realize 
welfare losses. 
The asymmetric impact of the cost change on the welfare of all relevant interest 
groups is summarized in Table II.4.1, while Figures II.4.13-II.4.15 summarize the 
system-wide market and welfare impacts of this cost reduction under the different 
scenarios considered in this study. For simplicity, the feedback effects described above 
(Figures II.4.11 and II.4.12) are not included in Figures II.4.13-II.4.15.  
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Table II.4.1.  System-Wide Welfare Impacts of a Reduction in the Cost of the Suppliers of Inputs used in the Production of the  
          Reference Product, 
I
rgc  
 Consumers 
of ls 
switching    
to rg 
Consumers 
of rg 
Consumers 
of hs 
switching    
to rg 
Consumers 
of hs 
Producers   
of rg 
Producers   
of hs 
switching   
to rg 
Producers   
of hs 
Suppliers   
of rg 
Suppliers   
of hs 
Input 
Suppliers   
rg 
Input 
Suppliers      
hs 
Scenario  
I 
+ + some +  
some – 
– + + + + – + – 
Scenario 
II 
+ + + + + + + + – + – 
Scenario 
III 
+ + + + + some –   
some + 
– + – + – 
+    denotes welfare gains 
–    denotes welfare losses 
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Figure II.4.14.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of a Cost Reduction under Scenario II    
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Figure II.4.15.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of a Cost Reduction under Scenario III    
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Disaggregation of Welfare Changes and Comparison with Conventional Analysis 
The conclusions outlined above are important because they indicate that a proper 
accounting of the differential welfare impacts of a decrease in 
I
rgc  requires a 
disaggregated analysis, particularly in Scenarios I and III where some of the consumers 
(Scenario I) or some of the producers (Scenario III) of the substitute product realize 
welfare losses after they have optimally switched to the reference good. As was pointed 
out earlier in the book, the aggregate welfare changes can be determined using the 
calculation of producer and consumer surplus from the supply and demand curves. As 
will be shown in this section, however, the proper allocation of these surplus changes to 
different consumers and producers requires an additional disaggregation.  
To illustrate the issues involved in properly disaggregating the welfare changes, 
consider Scenario I where the consumer price of the reference good decreases and the 
consumer price of the substitute good increases (a similar analysis could be undertaken 
for producers in Scenario III). Figure II.4.16 (which is the same as Figure II.4.7) shows 
the utility curves for the reference and substitute goods with the welfare changes 
disaggregated. The solid lines show the utility curves before the decrease in 
I
rgc , while 
the dotted lines show the utility curves after the prices have taken their new equilibrium 
values as a result of the cost reduction.  
Figure II.4.17 shows the demand curves derived from the utility curves (these 
demand curves were presented earlier in Figure I.3). Before the cost is reduced, the 
consumer price of the reference good is 
c
rgp , while the consumer price of the substitute 
good is chsp . The corresponding quantities purchased are rgx and hsx . The decrease in 
I
rgc  reduces the consumer price of the reference good to 
'c
rgp . This reduced price, in turn, 
shifts in the demand curve for the substitute product from ( )
c
hs rgD p  to 
'( )chs rgD p . Recall 
that the price of the substitute product increases because of the shift in of the supply 
curve (not shown here; see Figure II.4.6, panel 1) – the resulting equilibrium price is 'chsp . 
At this price, consumption of the substitute good is 'hsx . The increase in the price of the 
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substitute good causes the demand curve for the reference good to shift upward from 
( )crg hsD p  to 
'( )crg hsD p . Given price 
'c
rgp , consumption of the reference good is 
'
rgx .  
As shown in Figure II.4.16, the decrease in 
I
rgc  results in a gain of area a for the 
consumers that enter the market of the reference good (those located between 'ls  and ls ) 
and a gain of area b to those that continue to purchase the reference good (those located 
between ls  and rg ). Of those that switch from the high quality substitute to the 
reference good, some gain (those located between 
rg  and 
''
rg ; the magnitude of the gain 
is area c plus area d) while some lose (those located between ''
rg  and 
'
rg ; the magnitude 
of the loss is area m). Finally, the consumers that originally purchased the high quality 
substitute lose (these consumers are located between '
rg  and 1; the size of the loss is area 
n). At the aggregate level, the welfare change is thus (a + b + c + d) - (m + n). 
 
 
Total consumer welfare change:  (a + b + c + d) - (m + n)   
hs consumers that switch to rg: - some gain (area c + d)  
- some lose (area m) 
hs consumers net gain = (c + d) – (m + n) 
rg consumers net gain = b 
ls consumers net gain = a 
rg consumers* net gain = (a + b + c + d) - m  
hs consumers* net loss = n   *ex post (i.e., after the cost reduction) 
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Figure II.4.16.  Consumer Welfare Impacts of Reduced 
I
rgc  under Scenario I:   
 Consumer Utility Space   
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These aggregate welfare changes can also be obtained from the demand curves presented 
in Figure II.4.17 (the various welfare areas have been labeled so that they match the 
utility areas in Figure II.4.16). As noted earlier, there are two methods of calculating the 
welfare change. The first method is to calculate the overall change in consumer surplus 
(denote this as 1CS ) given by the change in consumer surplus in the reference market 
evaluated at the new equilibrium price of the substitute good, plus the change in 
consumer surplus in the substitute market evaluated at the original price of the reference 
good. The second method is to calculate the aggregate change in consumer surplus 
(denote this as 2CS ) as the change in consumer surplus in the reference market 
evaluated at the original price of the substitute good, plus the change in consumer surplus 
in the substitute market evaluated at the new equilibrium price of the reference good.  
 
 
Figure II.2.16.  Consumer Welfare Impacts of Reduced 
I
rgc  under Scenario I:  
Price-Quantity Space 
 
Using the first method, the overall change in consumer surplus 1CS  is given by: 
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The above expression allocates a gain of utility equal to (a + b + c + d) to the reference 
market and a loss in utility equal to (m + n) to the substitute market. However, while the 
aggregate change is correct, the allocation to the two markets is neither correct nor 
particularly insightful. While most of the original consumers of the substitute good lose 
utility – this amount is equal to area (m + n) – there are some of these consumers that 
gain; this gain is given by area (c + d). As well, the original consumers of the reference 
good and those that were not consuming any of the two products and entered the market 
of the reference good after the cost reduction gain an amount equal to areas b and a, 
respectively. Allocating the cost and benefits according to the demand curves in each 
market overstates the benefits to those that originally consumed the reference product and 
overstates the costs to those that originally consumed the substitute product. In short, the 
calculation of consumer surplus from the demand curves does not provide a proper 
allocation of the costs and benefits to the various consumer groups.   
A similar problem emerges if the second method is used. Using this method, the 
aggregate change in consumer surplus 2CS is: 
 
'
'
'
2CS ( , ) ( , )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
rg hs
c
rg hs
c c
c
p p
c c
hsr hg r sg h h rg ss rg
p p
x p p dp x p p dp
a b c d h i j m n h i j a b c d m n
  
                 
   
    
While calculation of the welfare change in this way also yields the correct measure of the 
aggregate welfare change, it also overstates both the gain in the reference market and the 
loss in the substitute market. While these overstated amounts cancel each other out at the 
aggregate level, they yield incorrect results if they are used to determine the distributional 
impacts of a reduction in the costs faced by the reference product input suppliers.  
The need to disaggregate the consumer surplus measures is clearly important in 
Scenario I, since in this scenario some consumers gain and others lose from the decrease 
in 
I
rgc . However, if it is believed that the magnitude of the gain realized by consumers is 
also important, then disaggregating the gains that occur in Scenarios II and III may also 
be required as the effects of the cost reduction were shown to vary among consumers. 
The same conclusions, of course, can be drawn regarding the need to disaggregate 
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producer welfare. In this case, there is a clear need to disaggregate producer welfare in 
Scenario III, since in this case some of the producers that switch to producing the 
reference good will be worse off than they were originally in producing the substitute 
product. There may also be a need to disaggregate the changes in producer welfare in 
Scenarios I and II, since, as was shown in the previous sections, the welfare changes are 
not symmetric among producers.   
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II.5 Additional Considerations/Market Studies            
In addition to enabling the analysis of changing market structure, costs and consumer 
preferences, our framework can also be utilized to analyze the market and welfare 
impacts of the introduction of new products in the market. This is particularly 
important/relevant in the increasingly industrialized agri-food marketing system where 
the provision of an ever increasing variety of close but imperfect substitute products has 
been a key consumer demand (and food company strategy) (Giannakas, 2011). 
Specifically, the framework can be (and has been) used to (a) identify the exact conditions 
under which a new product/new technology will end up being ineffective, non-drastic 
(i.e., will coexist with the existing products/technologies), or drastic (i.e., successful 
enough to drive its competing products/technologies out of the market), and (b) determine 
the market and welfare impacts in each case. Examples of new product introductions that 
have been analyzed using variants/adaptations of our methodological framework are the 
producer-oriented first-generation GM products (Fulton and Giannakas, 2004), consumer-
oriented second-generation GM products (Giannakas and Yiannaka, 2008), and products 
of food nanotechnology (Tran, Yiannaka and Giannakas, 2018). 
 The framework can also be utilized to analyze the optimal strategies of firms 
under different structures of the costs associated with these strategies. For instance, the 
framework can be used to determine optimal cost-reducing or/and quality-enhancing 
innovation activity – process and product innovation activity, respectively, affecting the 
production costs (as in Section II.4) and consumer preferences/valuation of the good (as 
in Section II.1) – and advertising strategies (also affecting consumer preferences) by 
equating the marginal innovation or advertising costs with the marginal benefits of these 
activities (identified in the aforementioned sections). Similarly, it can be used to 
determine whether the benefits from innovation or/and advertising activities (due to an 
increased consumer valuation of a product or reduced costs of production) justify the 
high fixed (and, often, sunk) costs associated with such strategies. A similar analysis 
could also reveal whether benefits from mergers and acquisitions (due to increased 
market power and/or reduced costs resulting from these activities) exceed the (search, 
negotiation, bargaining, information, and adjustment) costs of such activities.  
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III.   Policy Analysis 
This part of the book utilizes the methodological framework developed in Section I to 
analyze the market and (disaggregated) welfare impacts of standard, textbook policy 
mechanisms like subsidies and taxes. In particular, the following sections focus on the 
analysis of: 
1. Output (producer/consumer) subsidy under perfect competition 
2. Consumption tax under imperfect competition  
3. Input subsidy under imperfect competition  
The section concludes with a discussion of other food and energy policies that can be 
(and have been) analyzed using our framework of analysis. 
 
III.1. Output Subsidy under Perfect Competition 
To determine the system-wide market and welfare impacts of the output subsidy, we 
compare and contrast the equilibrium prices, quantities, and welfare of the interest groups 
involved before and after the introduction of the policy. 
Pre-Subsidy Equilibrium under Perfect Competition  
The pre-subsidy equilibrium conditions under perfect competition in the output and input 
markets can be derived by substituting 0 Ihs
b
hs
s
hs
I
rg
b
rg
s
rg   in equations 
(I.24)-(I.31) of Section I, and are given by: 
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I
rg rgw c          (III.1.3) 
I
hs hsw c          (III.1.4) 
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Equilibrium Conditions under the Subsidy   
Consider now the equilibrium conditions after the introduction of an output subsidy, s. As 
shown in Figure III.1.1 below, the subsidy results in (a) increased price received by the 
producers of the regulated product (compare the producer price with and without the 
output subsidy, fsrgp  and 
e
rgp , respectively); (b) reduced consumer price (compare 
cs
rgp   
and 
e
rgp ); and (c) increased equilibrium quantity of the regulated product (compare 
s
rgx  
and 
e
rgx ).  Producer surplus increases by ))((
2
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rg
e
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e
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rg xxppPS  , consumer  
surplus increases by ))((
2
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e
rg xxppCS  , and the deadweight welfare losses of 
the program (distortionary costs of market intervention) are given by the difference 
between the taxpayer costs, srg
s
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rg sxxppTC  )( , and the consumer and producer 
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Figure III.1.1.  Output Subsidy in the rg Market under Perfect Competition  
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In addition to affecting the market for the regulated product, the introduction of the 
subsidy has an effect on the vertically, horizontally and diagonally related markets and 
our integrated framework of analysis can help identify the system-wide market and 
welfare impacts of this policy. Indeed, the market reaction functions in the presence of 
the subsidy become: 
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As mentioned earlier, solving the equations for the equilibrium prices simultaneously 
allows the expression of the output prices as functions of the exogenous variables of the 
model (i.e., subsidy, preference and cost parameters). Substituting these prices into the 
expressions for the equilibrium quantities, consumer welfare and producer net returns 
enables the expression of all equilibrium conditions as functions of the exogenous 
variables of the model. Perhaps more importantly, the nature of the interdependence of 
markets captured by these expressions provide, along with the related graphical 
representation, valuable insights on the mechanism through which the policy affects the 
different markets. The rest of this section discusses the market and welfare impacts of the 
output subsidy using the integrated heterogeneous agent framework presented in Section I. 
- 122 - 
 
 
 
System-Wide Market and Welfare Effects of an Output Subsidy  
The analysis in this part focuses on the impact of the subsidy on the input and output 
markets for the regulated product and its substitute, as well as its effects on the welfare of 
all interest groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, middlemen and input suppliers in 
the markets for the two products). In addition to determining changes in the aggregate 
consumer and producer welfare, our integrated heterogeneous agent framework enables us 
to (a) determine the effects of the subsidy on different consumers and producers of the two 
products and (b) capture relevant indirect and feedback effects of the policy that are not 
accounted for when focusing solely on the market of the regulated product.  
Beginning with the direct consumer effects of the subsidy, we see that the 
reduction in the consumer price of the regulated/subsidized product (a) increases the 
utility associated with the consumption of this product (see equation (I.1)) and (b) attracts 
previous consumers of substitute products to the regulated product. Graphically, the 
reduction in 
c
rgp  causes an upward parallel shift of rgU  and the switching of consumers 
with differentiating attributes ( , ]s els ls    and ( , ]
e s
rg rg    in Figure III.1.2 to the 
regulated product.  
 
 
Figure III.1.2.  Direct Effects of the Output Subsidy on Consumption Decisions  
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Similar to consumers, the introduction of the subsidy benefits the producers of the 
regulated product and results in producers of alternative crops switching to the regulated 
product. Graphically, the increased 
f
rgp  causes an upward parallel shift of the net returns 
curve associated with the production of the regulated product and the switching of 
producers with ( , ]s ehs hsA A A  and ( , ]
e s
rg rgA A A  in Figure III.1.3 to the regulated product.  
 
 
Figure III.1.3.  Direct Effects of the Output Subsidy on Producer Decisions  
 
In addition to affecting the market for the regulated product, the changes in the consumer 
and producer prices of the regulated product caused by the output subsidy have a direct 
impact on the market for the substitute product (see equations (III.1.9) and (III.1.13)). 
Specifically, the reduced consumer price and the increased producer price of the 
regulated product in the presence of the subsidy attract to the regulated product previous 
consumers and producers of the substitute, affecting, this way, both the demand for and 
supply of the substitute product.  
Formally, the reduced 
c
rgp  causes a downward parallel shift of the demand for 
the substitute product hsD  (see equation (I.9) and Figure III.1.4), while the increased 
f
rgp  
causes an upward parallel shift of the supply of the substitute product hsS  (see equation 
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(I.19) and Figure III.1.4). While the reduced demand for, and supply of the substitute 
product always reduce the equilibrium quantity of this product, the effect on the 
equilibrium price is determined by the relative magnitude of the demand and supply 
effects of the output subsidy on the market for the substitute product. In particular, since 
a ceteris paribus decrease in hsD  (due to reduced 
c
rgp ) causes hsp  to fall, while a similar 
decrease in hsS  (due to increased 
f
rgp ) results in increased hsp , when the demand effect 
dominates the supply effect so that c f
rg rgp p
 
 

  

, the price of the substitute 
product falls after the introduction of the output subsidy in the market for the regulated 
product (Scenario I), while when the supply effect of the subsidy dominates the demand 
effect (i.e., when c frg rgp p
 
 

   

f c
rg rgp p
 
 

  

), the subsidization of the 
regulated product causes the price of the substitute product to increase (Scenario II). 
Panels 1 and 2 of Figure III.1.4 graph the effects of the output subsidy on the market of 
the substitute product under these two scenarios. 
 
 
Figure III.1.4.  Effects of the Output Subsidy on the Market for the Substitute hs Product  
 
  
      
panel 1: Scenario I panel 2: Scenario II 
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Since the equilibrium price of the substitute product affects the welfare of both consumers 
and producers of this product, our analysis considers the system-wide market and welfare 
impacts of the output subsidy under both possible effects on the price of the substitute 
product. The case where the introduction of the output subsidy in the market of the 
regulated product causes the price of its substitute product to fall (i.e., the case in which 
the demand effect dominates the supply effect of the subsidy) is analyzed first followed 
by the case in which the price of the substitute increases as the result of the policy.     
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Output Subsidy under Scenario I  
(i.e., when c f
rg rgp p
 
 

  

) 
As mentioned previously, when the demand effect dominates the supply effect on the 
market for the substitute product, the introduction of the output subsidy for the regulated 
product reduces both the quantity and the price of its substitute product.  
The reduced price of the substitute product, hsp , increases the utility associated 
with its consumption and reduces the number of consumers switching to the regulated 
product. Figure III.1.5 depicts these market and welfare effects in the consumer utility 
space. In addition, the figure shows that the consumers benefiting the most from the 
output subsidy are those consuming the regulated product both before and after the 
introduction of the policy (i.e., consumers with ( , ]),
e e
ls rg   followed by consumers 
who find it optimal to switch to the regulated product (i.e., consumers with ( , ]s els ls    
and 
'( , ])e srg rg   and consumers who continue to consume the substitute after the  
policy introduction (i.e., consumers with 
'( ,1]).srg  Total consumer benefits are given 
by 
'
'
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
e se
rg rgls
s e e s
ls ls rg rg
s s s s
c rg ls rg rg rg hs hs hsG U U d U U d U U d U U d
 
   
              . 
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While increasing the desirability of the substitute product for consumers, the reduced hsp  
reduces the net returns associated with the production of the substitute product and 
increases the incentives for switching to the production of the regulated product (see 
equation (III.1.12)). Figure III.1.6 depicts these market and welfare effects as well as the 
asymmetric impacts of the policy on producer welfare in the producer net returns space. 
Producers benefiting the most from the output subsidy are those producing the regulated 
product both before and after the introduction of the policy (i.e., producers with 
( , ]),e ehs rgA A A followed by producers who find it optimal to switch to the regulated 
product from the alternative crop (i.e., producers with ( , ]).
e s
rg rgA A A  Producers who 
continue to produce the substitute product after the policy introduction (i.e., producers 
with '(0, ])shsA A  lose, as do some of the substitute product producers who switch to the 
regulated product (i.e., producers with '( , )),s shs hsA A A with the magnitude of this loss 
determined by the differentiating attribute of these producers. The producer gains and 
losses are given by 
e
rg
e
hspU 
0 1 
e
hsx
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e
rgpU 
e
rgx
Consumer Utility 
U
e
ls
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s
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s
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s
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s
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rg
Figure III.1.5.  Total Effects of Output Subsidy on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenario I  
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Figure III.1.6.  Total Effects of Output Subsidy on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenario I 
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Output Subsidy under Scenario II  
(i.e., when c frg rgp p
 
 

  

) 
When the supply effect of an output subsidy dominates its demand effect on the market 
for the substitute product, the introduction of the output subsidy for the regulated product 
reduces the quantity but increases the price of its substitute product (recall panel 2 of 
Figure III.1.4 that depicts this scenario in the price-quantity space). 
The increased price of the substitute product, hsp , reduces the utility associated 
with the consumption of this product and further increases the number of consumers that 
find it optimal to switch to the regulated product (see equation (III.1.12)). Figure III.1.7 
depicts these market and welfare effects as well as the asymmetric impacts of the policy 
on the welfare of consumers in the consumer utility space. Similar to the case where the 
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demand effect of the policy dominates, the consumers benefiting the most from the 
output subsidy are those consuming the regulated product both before and after the 
introduction of the policy (i.e., consumers with ( , ]).
e e
ls rg    Unlike the case of the 
dominant demand effect, however, all consumers of the substitute product in the presence 
of the policy (i.e., consumers with 
'( ,1])srg  as well as some consumers that find it 
optimal to switch from the substitute product to the regulated good (i.e., consumers with 
'( , ]s srg rg    in Figure III.1.7) lose from the introduction of the policy, with the 
magnitude of their loss determined by their preference parameter α. The consumer gains  
and losses in this case are given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
e se
rg rgls
s e e
ls ls rg
s s s
c rg ls rg rg rg hsG U U d U U d U U d
 
  
           and 
'
'
1
( ) ( )
s
rg
s s
rg rg
s s
c hs rg hs hsL U U d U U d

 
      , respectively. 
 
 
Figure III.1.7.  Total Effects of Output Subsidy on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenario II 
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While decreasing the desirability of the substitute product for consumers, the increased 
hsp  increases the net returns associated with the production of the substitute product and 
reduces the incentives for switching to the production of the regulated product. Figure 
III.1.8 depicts these market and welfare effects in the producer net returns space. Producers 
benefiting the most from the output subsidy are those producing the regulated product both 
before and after the introduction of the policy (i.e., producers with ( , ]),
e e
hs rgA A A  
followed by producers who find it optimal to switch to the regulated product (i.e., 
producers with ( , ]
e s
rg rgA A A  and 
'( , ])s ehs hsA A A and producers who continue to produce 
the substitute after the policy introduction (i.e., producers with '(0, ]).shsA A  Total  
producer benefits when c frg rgp p
 
 

  

 are given by 
'
'0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
e ss e
rg rghs hs
s e e
hs hs rg
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s s s s
p hs hs rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
G NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA           . 
 
 
Figure III.1.8.  Total Effects of Output Subsidy on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenario II 
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In addition to affecting the decisions and welfare of consumers and producers of the 
substitute product, the changes in hsp  have a feedback effect on the market for the 
regulated product. In particular, a reduction (increase) in hsp  reduces (increases) the 
demand and increases (reduces) the supply of the regulated product (see equations (I.8), 
(I.9), (I.18), (I.19) and Figures I.3 and I.5). The total effects of the output subsidy on the 
final consumer market for the regulated product under the two scenarios considered here 
are depicted in panels 1 and 2 of Figure III.1.9.  
 
 
Figure III.1.9.  Overall Effects of an Output Subsidy on the rg Market  
 
Finally, regarding the impact of the output subsidy on the markets for the inputs used in the 
production of the regulated product and its substitute, no matter the relative magnitude of 
its demand and supply effects on the market for the substitute product (and its effect on 
hsp ), the introduction of an output subsidy in the market for the regulated product 
increases the demand for inputs used in the production of the regulated product (so that the 
increased production of this product in the presence of the subsidy can be facilitated) and 
reduces the demand for inputs used in the production of the substitute product (see 
equations (III.1.12) and (III.1.13)). The effects of the subsidy on the input markets are 
depicted in Figure III.1.10.     
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Figure III.1.10.  Output Subsidy Impact on the Input Markets 
 
Overall, the analysis of the system-wide market and welfare effects of the output subsidy 
indicates that: (a) the qualitative nature of the welfare effects on the consumers and 
producers of the substitute product is scenario-specific and depends on the conditions in 
the market for both the regulated product and the substitute product; (b) the impacts of 
the output subsidy are asymmetric across the different consumers and producers affected 
by the policy; (c) determination of these asymmetric impacts requires a disaggregation of 
the benefits and costs to the level of the individual agent; and (d) some of the producers 
(Scenario I) or some of the consumers (Scenario II) who find it optimal to switch from 
the substitute product to the regulated good after the introduction of the subsidy realize 
welfare losses. 
The asymmetric impact of the policy on the welfare of all relevant interest groups 
is summarized in Table III.1.1, while Figures III.1.11 and III.1.12 summarize the system-
wide market and welfare impacts of the output subsidy under the two scenarios 
considered in this study.   
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Table III.1.1.  System-Wide Welfare Impacts of an Output Subsidy 
 Consumers 
of ls 
switching    
to rg 
Consumers 
of rg 
Consumers 
of hs 
switching    
to rg 
Consumers 
of hs 
Producers   
of rg 
Producers   
of hs 
switching   
to rg 
Producers   
of hs 
Suppliers   
of rg 
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of hs 
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rg 
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I 
+ + + + + some –   
some + 
– nc nc nc nc 
Scenario 
II 
+ + some +  
some – 
– + + + nc nc nc nc 
+    denotes welfare gains 
–    denotes welfare losses 
nc   denotes no change 
 
Condition for Scenario I: c frg rgp p
 
 

  

 
Condition for Scenario II: c frg rgp p
 
 

  

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Figure III.1.11.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of an Output Subsidy under Scenario I 
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Figure III.1.12.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of an Output Subsidy under Scenario II 
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Disaggregation of Welfare Changes and Comparison with Conventional Analysis 
Before concluding the analysis of this policy, it is important to note that the key findings 
outlined above are important because they indicate that a proper accounting of the 
differential welfare impacts of an output subsidy requires a disaggregated analysis, as 
some of the consumers (Scenario II) or some of the producers (Scenario I) of the 
substitute product realize welfare losses after they have optimally switched to the 
regulated good. While, as was pointed out earlier, the aggregate welfare changes can be 
determined using the calculation of producer and consumer surplus from the supply and 
demand curves, the allocation of the welfare changes to the two markets is incorrect.  
Following the same approach developed in the analysis of the reduced 
I
rgc  in 
Section II.4 (as in both cases the changes in the consumer prices of the different products 
are qualitatively the same), it can be shown that, similar to the case of reduced 
I
rgc  
Scenario I, allocating the cost and benefits according to the demand curves in each 
market overstates the benefits to those that originally consumed the regulated product and 
overstates the costs to those that originally consumed the substitute product (i.e., 
overstates both the gain in the regulated market and the loss in the substitute market). In 
short, the calculation of consumer surplus from the demand curves does not provide a 
proper allocation of the costs and benefits to the various consumer groups. While these 
overstated amounts cancel each other out at the aggregate level, they yield incorrect 
results if they are used to determine the distributional impacts of an output subsidy.  
The need to disaggregate the consumer surplus measures is clearly important in 
Scenario II, since in this scenario some consumers gain and others lose from the 
introduction of the output subsidy. However, if it is believed that the magnitude of the 
gain realized by consumers is also important, then disaggregating the gains that occur in 
Scenario I may also be required as the effects of the subsidy were shown to vary among 
consumers. The same conclusions, of course, can be drawn regarding the need to 
disaggregate producer welfare. In this case, there is a clear need to disaggregate producer 
welfare in Scenario I, since in this case some of the producers that switch to the regulated 
good will be worse off than they were originally in producing the substitute product. 
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There may also be a need to disaggregate the changes in producer welfare in Scenario II, 
since, as was shown in the previous sections, the welfare changes are not symmetric 
among producers.   
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III.2. Consumption Tax under Imperfect Competition  
Similar to the output subsidy case, to determine the system-wide market and welfare 
impacts of a consumption tax, we compare and contrast the equilibrium prices, quantities, 
and welfare of the interest groups involved before and after the introduction of the tax. 
With the pre-tax equilibrium conditions derived in Section I (and graphed in Figure I.9), 
our focus here is on the (system-wide) equilibrium conditions under the tax. Once the 
effects of the tax on the market where it is introduced have been determined (i.e., the 
final consumer market for the regulated product), we proceed in discussing the impacts of 
the policy on the vertically, horizontally and diagonally related markets and interest 
groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, middlemen and input suppliers in the supply 
channels of the regulated and substitute products).  
 
Equilibrium Conditions under a Consumption Tax  
The introduction of a consumption tax for a product creates a difference/margin between 
the price paid by consumers and the price actually received by the suppliers of this 
product; the difference being the unit tax, t. With the demand curve depicting the 
consumer valuation of (and maximum willingness to pay for) a product, a tax can be 
viewed/conceptualized as creating a difference between the maximum consumer 
willingness to pay for (different units of) a product and the maximum price suppliers can 
charge for (the different units of) this product. Graphically, the tax t can be depicted as 
creating an inward parallel shift of the demand schedule faced by the suppliers of the 
product (and a difference between the actual consumer demand rgD  and the demand 
curve faced by the product suppliers, 
'
rgD ). 
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Figure II.2.1.  Consumption Tax under Imperfect Competition (Monempory/Oligempory) 
 
As shown in Figure III.2.1 above, the introduction of a consumption tax results in (a) 
increased consumer price of the regulated product (compare the consumer price before 
and after the tax, 
c
rgp  and 
ct
rgp , respectively); (b) reduced supplier/middlemen price 
(compare 
c
rgp  and 
mt
rgp ); (c) reduced price received by the producers of the regulated 
product (compare 
f
rgp  and 
ft
rgp ); and (d) reduced equilibrium quantity of the regulated 
product (compare rgx  and 
t
rgx ). Consumers, middlemen and producers of the regulated 
product lose while taxpayers receive the tax revenues on the equilibrium quantity under 
the tax regime.                
In addition to affecting the market for the regulated product, the introduction of 
the tax has an effect on the vertically, horizontally and diagonally related markets and our 
integrated framework of analysis can help identify the system-wide market and welfare 
impacts of this policy. Indeed, the equilibrium conditions/ market reaction functions in 
the presence of the tax become: 
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As mentioned earlier, solving the equations for the equilibrium prices simultaneously 
allows the expression of the output and input prices as functions of the exogenous 
variables of the model (i.e., tax, preference, market power and cost parameters). 
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Substituting these prices into the expressions for the equilibrium quantities, firm profits, 
consumer welfare and producer net returns enables the expression of all equilibrium 
conditions as functions of the exogenous variables of the model. The nature of the 
interdependence of markets captured by these expressions provides, along with the 
related graphical representation, valuable insights on the mechanism through which the 
policy affects the different vertically, horizontally, and diagonally related markets. The 
section below discusses the market and welfare impacts of the consumption tax using the 
integrated heterogeneous agent framework presented in Section I. 
 
System-Wide Market and Welfare Effects of a Consumption Tax  
The analysis in this part focuses on the impact of the tax on the input and output markets 
for the regulated product and its substitute, as well as its effects on the welfare of all 
interest groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, middlemen and input suppliers in 
the markets for the two products). In addition to determining changes in aggregate 
consumer and producer welfare, our integrated heterogeneous agent framework enables 
us to (a) determine the effects of the tax on different consumers and producers of the two 
products and (b) capture indirect and feedback effects of the policy that are not accounted 
for when focusing solely on the market of the regulated product.  
Beginning with the direct consumer effects of the tax, we see that the increase in 
the consumer price of the regulated/taxed product (a) reduces the utility associated with 
the consumption of this product and (b) drives consumers of the regulated product to 
substitute products. Graphically, the increase in 
c
rgp  causes a downward parallel shift of 
rgU  and the exit of consumers with differentiating attributes ( , ]
t
ls ls    and 
( , ]trg rg    in Figure III.2.2 from the market for the regulated product.  
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Figure III.2.2.  Direct Effects of the Tax on Consumption Decisions and Welfare 
 
Similar to consumers, the introduction of the tax hurts the producers of the regulated 
product and results in a number of them switching to alternative crops. Graphically, the 
reduced 
f
rgp  causes an downward parallel shift of the net returns curve associated with 
the production of the regulated product and the switching of producers with  
( , ]ths hsA A A  and ( , ]
t
rg rgA A A  in Figure III.2.3 to alternative products.  
 
 
Figure II.2.3.  Direct Effects of the Tax on Producer Decisions and Welfare 
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As expected, in addition to affecting the market for the regulated product, the changes in 
the consumer and producer prices of the regulated product caused by the tax have a direct 
impact on the market for the substitute product. The increased consumer price and the 
reduced producer price of the regulated product in the presence of the tax drive a number 
of consumers and producers out of the market for the regulated product affecting, this 
way, both the demand for and supply of the substitute product.  
Formally, the increased 
c
rgp  causes an upward parallel shift of the demand for 
the substitute product, hsD (see equation (I.9) and Figure III.2.4), while the reduced 
f
rgp
causes a downward parallel shift of the supply of the substitute product, hsS (see equation 
(I.19) and Figure III.2.4). While the increased demand for, and supply of the substitute 
product always increase the equilibrium quantity and profits of the suppliers of this 
product, the effect on the equilibrium consumer and producer prices ( chsp  and 
f
hsp , 
respectively) is determined by the relative magnitude of the demand and supply effects of 
the tax on the market for the substitute product. In particular, since a ceteris paribus 
increase in hsD  causes 
c
hsp  and 
f
hsp  to increase, while a similar increase in hsS  results in 
reduced chsp  and 
f
hsp , when the demand effect dominates the supply effect so that 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
 (where, as noted above, 
0crgp   and 0
f
rgp  , while, as shown in Figure III.2.11 below, 0rgw   and 
0hsw  ), the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product increase after the 
introduction of the tax (Scenario I); when 
( ) (1 )( )
(1 )( ) ( )
f c
rg rg hs rgs b
hs hs
s b
fhs hs
rg rg hs
p w w p
p w w
 
     
     
 

            
   
       
, 
the consumer price of the substitute product increases while the producer price falls 
(Scenario II); while when the supply effect of the tax dominates the demand effect so that 
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( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
, the taxation of the regulated 
product causes the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product to fall 
(Scenario III). Figure III.2.4 provides a graphical representation of the conditions leading 
to the three scenarios while panels 1, 2 and 3 of Figure III.2.5 graph the effects of the tax 
on the market of the substitute product under these three scenarios.  
 
Figure II.2.4.  Scenarios on the Effects of the Tax on Prices of the Substitute hs Product 
 
Figure III.2.5.  Effects of the Tax on the Market for the Substitute hs Product 
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It is important to note that for Scenario II to occur, the middlemen in the substitute 
product market should be able to exercise market power. If 0s bhs hs   , the condition 
for Scenario I becomes 
c f
rg rg rg hsp p w w
 
 

        
 and the condition for 
Scenario III becomes 
c f
rg rg rg hsp p w w
 
 

        
. Intuitively, under perfectly 
competitive middlemen in the substitute product market, the consumer and producer 
prices of this product will always move in the same direction. While the presence of 
middlemen market power is necessary for the consumer and producer prices of the 
substitute product to move in different directions, it is not sufficient for the emergence of 
Scenario II – as shown above, both Scenarios I and III can emerge in the presence of 
middlemen market power.  
Since the equilibrium prices of the substitute product affect the welfare of the 
consumers and producers of this product, our analysis considers the market and welfare 
impacts of the tax under the three scenarios outlined above. The case where the 
introduction of the tax in the market of the regulated product causes the consumer and 
producer prices of its substitute to increase (i.e., the case in which the demand effect 
dominates the supply effect of the tax) is analyzed first followed by the other two 
scenarios considered here. In all cases, suppliers of the substitute product see their profits 
increase after the introduction of the tax, with the change in profits given by 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0.ct c ct ft t ft fhs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hsp p x p p x x p p x             
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Tax under Scenario I  
(i.e., when 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
) 
As mentioned previously, when the demand effect of a tax dominates its supply effect, 
the introduction of the tax for the regulated product increases the consumer and producer 
prices of its substitute product (recall panel 1 of Figure III.2.5 that depicts this scenario in 
the price-quantity space).  
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The increased consumer price of the substitute product, chsp , reduces the utility 
associated with the consumption of this product and limits the number of consumers of 
the regulated product switching to the substitute product. Figure III.2.6 depicts these 
market and welfare effects in the consumer utility space. In addition, the figure shows 
that the consumers hurt the most from the tax are those consuming the regulated product 
both before and after the introduction of the policy (i.e., consumers with 
'( , ]),t tls rg    
followed by consumers who find it optimal to turn away from the regulated product (i.e., 
consumers with 
'( , ]trg rg    and ( , ]),
t
ls ls   and consumers who consume the 
substitute before and after the policy introduction (i.e., consumers with ( ,1]).rg   
Total consumer losses from the tax are given by 
'
'
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
tt
rg rgls
t t
ls ls rg rg
t t t
c rg ls rg rg rg hs hs hsL U U d U U d U U d U U d
 
   
              . 
 
Figure III.2.6.  Total Effects of the Tax on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenarios I & II 
 
While the increased chsp  reduces the desirability of the substitute product for consumers, 
the increased fhsp  increases the net returns associated with the production of the 
substitute product and, thus, increases the incentives for switching to the production of 
 
't
rg  
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this product. Figure III.2.7 depicts these market and welfare effects as well as the 
asymmetric impacts of the policy in the producer net returns space. Producers losing the 
most from the tax are those producing the regulated product both before and after the 
introduction of the policy (i.e., producers with ( , ]),
t t
hs rgA A A followed by producers 
who find it optimal to switch from the regulated product to the alternative crop (i.e., 
producers with ( , ]),
t
rg rgA A A and the producers with 
'( , ])t ths hsA A A who switch from 
the regulated product to the substitute.  
Producers who produce the substitute before and after the policy introduction 
(i.e., producers with [0, ])hsA A  gain, as do some of the regulated product producers 
who switch to the substitute (i.e., producers with '( , )),ths hsA A A with the magnitude of 
this gain determined by the efficiency parameter/differentiating attribute of these  
producers. Producer gains and losses in this case are given by  
'
' '
0
( ) ( )
t
hs hs
hs
A A
t t
p hs hs hs rg
A
G NR NR dA NR NR dA      and 
'
' '( ) ( ) ( )
tt
rg rghs
t t t
hs hs rg
A AA
t t
p rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
L NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA        , respectively.  
 
Figure II.2.7.  Total Effects of the Tax on Producer Decisions and Welfare under Scenario I 
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Market and Welfare Effects of the Tax under Scenario II (i.e., when 
( ) (1 )( )
(1 )( ) ( )
f c
rg rg hs rgs b
hs hs
s b
fhs hs
rg rg hs
p w w p
p w w
 
     
     
 

            
   
       
) 
As shown in panel 2 of Figure III.2.5, under Scenario II the consumer price of the 
substitute product increases while the producer price falls causing both consumers and 
producers of this product to lose.  
 Predictably, the ramifications of the policy for the consumers of the different 
products are similar to those under Scenario I (described in the previous section and 
graphed in Figure III.2.6), as chsp  increases under both Scenarios I and II. Thus, the tax 
under Scenario II hurts all regulated and substitute product consumers with the greater 
losses incurred by those consumers who buy the regulated product both before and after 
the introduction of the tax. 
 Unlike Scenario I, producers of the substitute product lose under Scenario II as 
the introduction of a tax for the regulated product causes the producer price of the 
substitute product, fhsp , to fall. The reduced 
f
hsp  reduces the net returns associated with 
the production of this product and limits the number of producers who find it optimal to 
switch to the substitute product after the introduction of the tax (recall that the reduction 
in the price received by the producers of the regulated product creates incentives for a 
number of them to switch to the substitute and alternative crops; see Figure III.2.3).  
Figure III.2.8 depicts these market and welfare effects in the producer net returns 
space. In addition, the figure shows that the producers losing the most from the tax are 
those producing the regulated product both before and after the introduction of the policy 
(i.e., producers with ( , ]),
t t
hs rgA A A followed by producers who switch from the 
regulated to the alternative and substitute crops (i.e., producers with ( , ]
t
rg rgA A A  and 
( , ]),ths hsA A A and producers who continue to produce the substitute product after the 
policy introduction (i.e., producers with [0, ]).hsA A Total producer losses from the tax 
in this case are given by  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
tt
rg rghs hs
t t
hs hs rg
A AA A
t t t
p hs hs rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
L NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA            
 
Figure III.2.8.  Total Effects of the Tax on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenarios II and III 
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Tax under Scenario III  
(i.e., when 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
) 
When the supply effect of the tax dominates the demand effect, the taxation of the 
regulated product causes the consumer and producer prices of the substitute good to fall. 
While the effects of the reduced fhsp  on producer decisions and welfare are similar to 
those under Scenario II (described in the previous section and graphed in Figure III.2.8), 
the effects of the tax on consumers are different than those under Scenarios I and II. 
 Specifically, the reduced chsp  increases the utility associated with the 
consumption of the substitute product and increases the number of consumers switching 
from the regulated product. Figure III.2.9 depicts these market and welfare effects as well 
as the asymmetric impacts of the tax on consumer welfare in the consumer utility space. 
Similar to Scenarios I and II, consumers losing the most from the tax are those 
consuming the regulated product both before and after the introduction of the policy (i.e., 
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consumers with ( , ]),
t t
ls rg   followed by consumers who find it optimal to turn away 
from the regulated product (i.e., consumers with 
'( , ]t trg rg    and ( , ]).
t
ls ls    
Unlike Scenarios I and II, however, consumers who prefer the substitute product before 
and after the policy introduction (i.e., consumers with ( ,1])rg  gain, as do some of 
the regulated product consumers who switch to the substitute (i.e., consumers with 
'( , ]),trg rg   with the magnitude of this gain determined by the differentiating  
attribute of these consumers. Consumer gains and losses in this case are given by 
'
1
( ) ( )
rg
t
rg rg
t t
c hs rg hs hsG U U d U U d

 
       and 
'
( ) ( ) ( )
t tt
rg rgls
t t
ls ls ls
t t
c rg ls rg rg rg hsL U U d U U d U U d
 
  
          , respectively.  
 
 
Figure III.2.9.  Total Effects of the Tax on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenario III 
 
In addition to affecting the decisions and welfare of consumers and producers of the 
substitute product, the changes in chsp  and 
f
hsp  have a feedback effect on the market for 
the regulated product. In particular, an increase (decrease) in chsp  shifts the demand for 
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the regulated product rgD upwards (downwards), while an increase (decrease) in 
f
hsp
causes an upward (downward) shift of the supply of the regulated product rgS (recall 
equations (I.8) and (I.18) and Figures I.3 and I.5). The total effects of the tax on the final 
consumer market for the regulated product under the three scenarios considered here are 
depicted in panels 1-3 of Figure III.2.10. In all cases, the policy causes a reduction in the 
regulated product supplier profits, with the change in profits given by  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0c mt t c f t f ft trg rg rg rg rg rg rg rg rg rg rgp p x p p x x p p x         . 
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Figure III.2.10.  Overall Impact of the Tax on the rg Market  
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Finally, regarding the impact of the tax on the markets for the inputs used in the 
production of the regulated product and its substitute, no matter the effect of the policy on 
c
hsp  and 
f
hsp , the introduction of a tax in the market for the regulated product reduces the 
demand for inputs used in the production of this product (as the equilibrium quantity of 
the regulated product falls in the presence of the tax; see equation (III.2.8)) and increases 
the demand for inputs used in the production of the substitute (so that the increased 
production of this product in the presence of the tax can be facilitated).  
The reduced equilibrium price and quantity of the inputs used in the production of 
the regulated product result in reduced profits for the suppliers of these inputs, while the 
increased price and quantity of the inputs used in the production of the substitute increase 
the profits of the suppliers of these inputs. The change in the profits of the rg input 
suppliers is given by ( ) ( ) 0I I t I trg rg rg rg rg rg rgw c x w c x        
, while the change in the 
profits of the hs input suppliers is ( ) ( ) 0I t I t Ihs hs hs hs hs hs hsw c x w c x      . The 
market and welfare effects of the tax on the input markets are depicted in Figure III.2.11.  
 
 
Figure III.2.11.  Tax Impact on the Input Markets 
 
Overall, the analysis of the system-wide market and welfare effects of the consumption 
tax indicates that: (a) the qualitative nature of the welfare effects on the consumers and 
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producers of the substitute product is scenario-specific and depends on the conditions in 
the market for both the regulated product and the substitute product; (b) the impacts of 
the consumption tax are asymmetric across the different consumers and producers 
affected by the policy; (c) determination of these asymmetric impacts requires a 
disaggregation of the benefits and costs to the level of the individual agent; and (d) in 
Scenarios I and III, some of the consumers (Scenario III) or some of the producers 
(Scenario I) who find it optimal to switch from the regulated product to its substitute after 
the introduction of the consumption tax realize welfare gains. 
Table III.2.1 summarizes the asymmetric effects of the policy on the welfare of 
all relevant interest groups, while Figures III.2.12-III.2.14 summarize the system-wide 
market and welfare impacts of the tax under the different scenarios considered in this 
study. For simplicity, the feedback effect on the rg market (depicted in Figure III.2.10) is 
not included in Figures III.2.12-III.2.14.  
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Table III.2.1.  System-Wide Welfare Impacts of a Consumption Tax 
 Consumers 
of rg 
switching   
to ls 
Consumers 
of rg 
Consumers 
of rg 
switching   
to hs 
Consumers 
of hs 
Producers  
of rg 
Producers  
of rg 
switching   
to hs 
Producers  
of hs 
Suppliers   
of rg 
Suppliers   
of hs 
Input 
Suppliers   
rg 
Input 
Suppliers   
hs 
Scenario  
I 
– – – – – some +  
some – 
+ – + – + 
Scenario 
II 
– – – – – – – – + – + 
Scenario 
III 
– – some –  
some + 
+ – – – – + – + 
+    denotes welfare gains 
–    denotes welfare losses 
 
Condition for Scenario I: 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
 
Condition for Scenario II: 
(1 )( ) ( )
( ) (1 )( )
s b
f c fhs hs
rg rg hs rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p w w p p w w
      
      
   
                     
 
Condition for Scenario III: 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
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Figure III.2.12.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of a Consumption Tax under Scenario I    
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Figure III.2.13.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of a Consumption Tax under Scenario II    
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Figure III.2.14.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of a Consumption Tax under Scenario III  
- 157 - 
 
 
 
Disaggregation of Welfare Changes and Comparison with Conventional Analysis 
Before concluding the analysis of this policy, it is important to note that the key findings 
of this section outlined above are important because they indicate that a proper 
accounting of the differential welfare impacts of a tax requires a disaggregated analysis, 
particularly in Scenarios I and III where some of the consumers (Scenario III) or some of 
the producers (Scenario I) of the regulated product realize welfare gains after they have 
optimally switched. While, as was pointed out earlier, the aggregate welfare changes can 
be determined using the calculation of producer and consumer surplus from the supply 
and demand curves, the allocation of the welfare changes to the two markets is incorrect.  
Following the same approach developed in the analysis of the increased rg in 
Section II.2 (as in both cases the changes in the consumer and producer prices of the 
different products are qualitatively the same), it can be shown that, similar to the case of 
increased rg Scenario III, allocating the costs and benefits according to the demand curves 
in each market overstates the benefits to those that originally consumed the substitute 
product and overstates the costs to those that originally consumed the regulated product 
(i.e., overstates both the loss in the regulated market and the gain in the substitute market). 
In short, the calculation of consumer surplus from the demand curves does not provide a 
proper allocation of the costs and benefits of the tax to the various consumer groups. While 
these overstated amounts cancel each other out at the aggregate level, they yield incorrect 
results if they are used to determine the distributional impacts of a tax.  
The need to disaggregate the consumer surplus measures is clearly important in 
Scenario III, since in this scenario some consumers gain and others lose from the 
introduction of a tax. However, if it is believed that the magnitude of the loss felt by 
consumers is also important (as would be the case if consumers exhibit loss aversion, for 
instance), then disaggregating the losses that occur in Scenarios I and II may also be 
required as the effects of the policy were shown to vary among consumers. The same 
conclusions, of course, can be drawn regarding the need to disaggregate producer 
welfare. In this case, there is a clear need to disaggregate producer welfare in Scenario I, 
since in this case the producer price of the substitute good rises and some of the 
producers that switch to producing the substitute good will be better off than they were 
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originally in producing the regulated product. There may also be a need to disaggregate 
the changes in producer welfare in Scenarios II and III, since as was shown in the 
previous sections, the welfare changes are not symmetric among producers.   
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III.3. Input Subsidy under Imperfect Competition            
To determine the system-wide market and welfare impacts of the input subsidy, we 
compare and contrast the equilibrium prices, quantities, and welfare of the interest groups 
involved before and after the introduction of the subsidy. With the pre-subsidy 
equilibrium conditions derived in Section I (and graphed in Figure I.9), our focus here is 
on the (system-wide) equilibrium conditions under the input subsidy. Once the effects of 
the input subsidy on the market where it is introduced have been determined (i.e., the 
input market for the regulated product), we proceed in discussing the impacts of the 
policy on the vertically, horizontally and diagonally related markets and interest groups 
involved (i.e., consumers, producers, middlemen and input suppliers in the supply 
channels of the regulated and its substitute products). Before proceeding with the 
analysis, it is important to note that, while focusing on input subsidies, the analysis 
presented below is more general and applies to all input cost-reducing government 
policies (such as energy and/or R&D subsidies, and public R&D). 
 
Equilibrium Conditions under an Input Subsidy  
The introduction of a unit subsidy s in an input market reduces the costs faced by the 
suppliers of this input by the amount of the subsidy. The lower costs result, then, in a 
reduction in the price of the input that is dependent on the degree of market power 
exercised by the suppliers of the regulated input. Graphically, the input subsidy s can be 
depicted as creating a downward parallel shift of the marginal cost schedule faced by the 
(imperfectly competitive) suppliers of the regulated input, and a subsequent reduction in 
the price of this input from rgw  to 
s
rgw  in Figure III.3.1.  
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Figure III.3.1.  Input Subsidy in an (Imperfectly Competitive) Input Market 
 
In addition to reducing the price of the regulated input, the introduction of an input 
subsidy results in increased equilibrium quantity (compare rgx  and 
s
rgx  in Figure III.3.1) 
and greater profits for the suppliers of this input (as the cost reduction exceeds the 
reduction in rgw ).                
Besides affecting the market for the regulated input, the introduction of the input 
subsidy has an effect on the vertically, horizontally and diagonally related markets and 
our integrated framework of analysis can help identify the system-wide market and 
welfare impacts of this policy. The equilibrium conditions/market reaction functions in 
the presence of the input subsidy can be derived by introducing the relationship between 
the costs faced by the input suppliers before and after the subsidy (i.e., 
Is I
rg rgc c s  ) in 
equations (I.24)-(I.31) and are given by: 
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As mentioned earlier, solving the equations for the equilibrium prices simultaneously 
allows the expression of the output and input prices as functions of the exogenous 
variables of the model (i.e., input subsidy, preference, market power and cost 
parameters). Substituting these prices into the expressions for the equilibrium quantities, 
firm profits, consumer welfare and producer net returns enables the expression of all 
equilibrium conditions as functions of the exogenous variables of the model. The nature 
of the interdependence of markets captured by these expressions provides, along with the 
related graphical representation, valuable insights on the mechanism through which the 
policy affects the different (vertically, horizontally and diagonally related) markets. The 
rest of this section discusses the market and welfare impacts of the input subsidy using 
the integrated heterogeneous agent framework developed in this book.  
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System-Wide Market and Welfare Effects of an Input Subsidy  
The analysis in this part focuses on the impact of the input subsidy on the input and 
output markets for the regulated product and its substitute, as well as its effects on the 
welfare of all interest groups involved (i.e., consumers, producers, middlemen and input 
suppliers in the markets for the two products). In addition to determining changes in the 
aggregate consumer and producer welfare, our integrated heterogeneous agent framework 
enables us to (a) determine the effects of the input subsidy on different consumers and 
producers of the two products and (b) capture indirect and feedback effects of the policy 
that are not accounted for when focusing solely on the market of the regulated input. It 
turns out that, since the input subsidy reduces the costs of input suppliers, the system-
wide market and welfare impacts of the policy are very similar to those of the cost 
reduction derived and discussed in Section II.4.  
Beginning with the direct producer effects of the input subsidy, we see that the 
reduction in the price of the regulated input, ,rgw (a) increases the net returns associated 
with the production of the product utilizing the subsidized input in its production process 
(regulated product, hereafter), and (b) attracts to the regulated product previous producers 
of substitute and alternative crops. Graphically, the reduction in rgw causes an upward 
parallel shift of rg and the switching of producers with differentiating attributes 
( , ]shs hsA A A  and ( , ]
s
rg rgA A A  in Figure III.3.2 to the regulated product.  
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Figure III.3.2.  Direct Effects of an Input Subsidy on Producer Decisions  
 
The increased appeal of the regulated product due to its reduced input costs increases the 
supply of the regulated product and, through this, reduces the consumer and producer 
prices of this product (see equations (III.3.1), (III.3.2) and (III.3.7)). Figure III.3.3 graphs 
the downward parallel shift of rgS and consequent increase in rgx  and reductions in 
c
rgp  
and 
f
rgp  due to the input subsidy. 
   
 
Figure III.3.3.  Direct Effects of an Input Subsidy on the Oligemporistic rg Market   
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Moving to the direct consumer effects of the input subsidy, we see that the reduction in 
the consumer price of the regulated product (a) increases the utility associated with the 
consumption of this product and (b) attracts some of the consumers of substitute products 
to the regulated product. Graphically, the reduction in 
c
rgp  causes an upward parallel shift 
of rgU and the switching of consumers with differentiating attributes ( , ]
s
ls ls    and 
( , ]srg rg    in Figure III.3.4 to the regulated product.  
 
 
Figure III.3.4.  Direct Effects of an Input Subsidy on Consumption Decisions  
 
In addition to affecting the market for the regulated product, the changes in this market 
caused by the input subsidy have a direct impact on the market for the substitute product. 
In particular, the reduced consumer price and the increased returns to the production of 
the regulated product in the presence of the subsidy attract to the regulated product 
previous consumers and producers of the substitute, affecting, this way, both the demand 
for and supply of the substitute product.  
Formally, the reduced 
c
rgp causes a downward parallel shift of the demand for the 
substitute product, hsD (see equation (I.9) and Figure III.3.6), while the reduced rgw  and 
f
rgp  cause an upward parallel shift of the supply of the substitute product, hsS (as the 
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reduction in rgw  exceeds that in 
f
rgp ; see equation (I.19) and Figure III.3.6). While the 
reduced demand for, and supply of the substitute product always reduce the equilibrium 
quantity and profits of the suppliers of this product, the effect on the equilibrium 
consumer and producer prices ( chsp  and 
f
hsp , respectively) is determined by the relative 
magnitude of the demand and supply effects of the input subsidy on the market for the 
substitute product. In particular, since a ceteris paribus decrease in hsD  causes 
c
hsp  and 
f
hsp  to fall, while a similar decrease in hsS  results in increased 
c
hsp  and 
f
hsp , when the 
supply effect dominates the demand effect so that 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
 (where, as noted above, 
0crgp  , 0
f
rgp  and 0rgw  , while, as shown in Figure III.3.12 below, 0hsw  ), 
the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product increase after the introduction 
of the input subsidy (Scenario I); when 
(1 )( ) ( )
,
( ) (1 )( )
s b
f c fhs hs
rg rg hs rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p w w p p w w
      
      
   
                     
 
the producer price of the substitute product increases while the consumer price falls 
(Scenario II); while when the demand effect of the input subsidy dominates the supply 
effect so that 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
, the input subsidy 
causes both the consumer and producer prices of the substitute product to fall (Scenario 
III). Figure III.3.5 provides a graphical representation of the conditions leading to the 
three scenarios while panels 1, 2 and 3 of Figure III.3.6 graph the effects of the input 
subsidy on the market of the substitute product under these three scenarios.  
 
 
 
Figure III.3.5.  Scenarios on the Effects of an Input Subsidy on Prices of Substitute hs Product 
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Figure III.3.6.  Effects of an Input Subsidy on the Market for the Substitute hs Product 
 
It is important to note that for Scenario II to occur, the middlemen in the substitute 
product market should be able to exercise market power. If 0s bhs hs   , the condition 
for Scenario I becomes c frg rg rg hsp p w w
 
 

        
and the condition for 
Scenario III becomes c frg rg rg hsp p w w
 
 

        
. Intuitively, under perfectly 
competitive middlemen in the substitute product market, the consumer and producer 
prices of this product will always move in the same direction. While the presence of 
middlemen market power is necessary for the consumer and producer prices of the 
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substitute product to move in different directions, it is not sufficient for the emergence of 
Scenario II – as shown above, both Scenarios I and III can emerge in the presence of 
middlemen market power.  
Since the equilibrium prices of the substitute product affect the welfare of the 
consumers and producers of this product, our analysis considers the market and welfare 
impacts of the input subsidy under the three scenarios outlined above. The case where the 
introduction of the input subsidy in the market of the regulated product causes the 
consumer and producer prices of its substitute product to increase (i.e., the case in which 
the supply effect dominates the demand effect of the subsidy) is analyzed first followed 
by the two other scenarios considered here. In all cases, suppliers of the substitute 
product realize a reduction in profits, with the change given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0.cs c s fs f s c f shs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hs hsp p x p p x p p x x                
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Input Subsidy under Scenario I  
(i.e., when 
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
 ) 
As mentioned previously, when the supply effect of an input subsidy dominates its 
demand effect, the introduction of the input subsidy for the regulated product increases 
the consumer and producer prices of its substitute product (recall panel 1 of Figure III.3.6 
that depicts this scenario in the price-quantity space).  
The increased consumer price of the substitute product, chsp , reduces the utility 
associated with the consumption of this product and further increases the number of 
consumers that find it optimal to switch to the regulated product (see equation (III.3.1)). 
Figure III.3.7 depicts these market and welfare effects as well as the asymmetric impacts 
of the policy on the welfare of consumers in the consumer utility space. In addition, the 
figure shows that the consumers benefiting the most from the input subsidy are those 
consuming the regulated product both before and after the introduction of the policy (i.e., 
consumers with ( , ])ls rg    followed by consumers who find it optimal to switch to 
the regulated product (i.e., consumers with ( , ]sls ls    and 
'( , )).srg rg    
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Consumers of the substitute product in the presence of the policy (i.e., consumers with 
( ,1])srg   as well as some consumers that find it optimal to switch their consumption 
from the substitute product to the regulated good (i.e., consumers with 
'( , ]s srg rg    in 
Figure III.3.7) lose from the introduction of the policy, with the magnitude of their loss 
determined by their preference parameter/differentiating attribute α. The consumer gains  
and losses in this case are given by  
'
( ) ( ) ( )
s
rg rgls
s
ls ls rg
s s s
c rg ls rg rg rg hsG U U d U U d U U d
 
  
           and 
'
1
( ) ( )
s
rg
s s
rg rg
s s
c hs rg hs hsL U U d U U d

 
      , respectively. 
 
 
Figure III.3.7.  Total Effects of an Input Subsidy on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenario I 
 
While the increased chsp  reduces the desirability of the substitute product for consumers, 
the increased fhsp  under Scenario I increases the net returns associated with the 
production of the substitute product and reduces the incentives for switching to the 
production of the regulated product. Figure III.3.8 depicts these market and welfare 
effects in the producer net returns space. Producers benefiting the most from the input 
subsidy are those producing the regulated product both before and after the introduction of 
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the policy (i.e., producers with ( , ]),hs rgA A A  followed by producers who find it optimal 
to switch to the regulated product (i.e., producers with ( , ]
s
rg rgA A A  and ( , ])
s
hs hsA A A  
and producers who continue to produce the substitute after the policy introduction (i.e.,  
producers with (0, ]).shsA A  Total producer benefits in this case are given by 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ss
rg rghs hs
s
hs hs rg
A AA A
s s s s
p hs hs rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
G NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA            
 
 
Figure III.3.8.  Total Effects of an Input Subsidy on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenarios I & II 
 
Market and Welfare Effects of the Input Subsidy under Scenario II (i.e., when  
(1 )( ) ( )
( ) (1 )( )
s b
f c fhs hs
rg rg hs rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p w w p p w w
      
      
   
                     
) 
As shown in panel 2 of Figure III.3.6, under Scenario II the consumer price of the 
substitute product falls while the producer price increases making consumers and 
producers of the substitute product better off.  
 Predictably, the ramifications of the policy for the producers of the different 
products are similar to those under Scenario I (described in the previous section and 
graphed in Figure III.3.8), as fhsp  increases under both Scenarios I and II. Thus, the input 
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subsidy under Scenario II benefits all regulated and substitute product producers with the 
greater benefits enjoyed by those individuals who produce the regulated product both 
before and after the introduction of the input subsidy. 
 Unlike Scenario I, consumers of the substitute product gain under Scenario II as 
the introduction of the input subsidy for the regulated product causes the consumer price 
of the substitute product, chsp , to fall. The reduced 
c
hsp  increases the utility associated 
with the consumption of this product and reduces the number of consumers switching to 
the regulated product (see equation (III.3.7)). Figure III.3.9 depicts these market and 
welfare effects in the consumer utility space. In addition, the figure shows that the 
consumers benefiting the most from the input subsidy are those consuming the regulated 
product both before and after the introduction of the policy (i.e., consumers with 
( , ]),ls rg    followed by consumers who find it optimal to switch to the regulated 
product (i.e., consumers with ( , ]sls ls    and ( , ])
s
rg rg    and consumers who 
continue to consume the substitute product after the policy introduction (i.e., consumers  
with ( ,1]).
s
rg  Total consumer benefits from the input subsidy in this case are given  
by 
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
s
rg rgls
s s
ls ls rg rg
s s s s
c rg ls rg rg rg hs hs hsG U U d U U d U U d U U d
 
   
              . 
 
Figure III.3.9.  Total Effects of Input Subsidy on Consumption Decisions and Welfare  
under Scenarios II & III 
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Market and Welfare Effects of the Tax under Scenario III  
(i.e., when 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
) 
When the demand effect of the input subsidy dominates the supply effect, subsidizing the 
input used in the production of the regulated product causes the consumer and producer 
prices of the substitute product to fall. While the effects of the reduced chsp  on consumer 
decisions and welfare are similar to those under Scenario II (described in the previous 
section and graphed in Figure III.3.9), the effects of the input subsidy on producers are 
different than those under Scenarios I and II. 
 Specifically, the reduced fhsp  reduces the net returns associated with the 
production of the substitute product and increases the incentives for switching to the 
production of the regulated product (see equation (III.3.1)). Figure III.3.10 depicts these 
market and welfare effects as well as the asymmetric impacts of the policy on producer 
welfare in the producer net returns space. Producers benefiting the most from the input 
subsidy are those producing the regulated product both before and after the introduction of 
the policy (i.e., producers with ( , ]),hs rgA A A followed by producers who find it optimal 
to switch to the regulated product from the alternative crop and the substitute product (i.e., 
producers with ( , ]
s
rg rgA A A  and 
'( , ]).shs hsA A A Producers who continue to produce the 
substitute after the policy introduction (i.e., producers with (0, ])shsA A  lose, as do some 
of the substitute product producers who switch to the regulated product (i.e., producers 
with '( , )),s shs hsA A A with the magnitude of this loss determined by the efficiency 
parameter/differentiating attribute of these producers. The producer gains and losses in 
this case are given by  
'
( ) ( ) ( )
s
rg rghs
s
hs hs rg
A AA
s s s
p rg hs rg rg rg a
A A A
G NR NR dA NR NR dA NR NR dA         and 
'
0
( ) ( )
s s
hs hs
s
hs
A A
s s
p hs hs hs rg
A
L NR NR dA NR NR dA     , respectively. 
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Figure III.3.10.  Total Effects of an Input Subsidy on Producer Decisions and Welfare  
  under Scenario III 
 
In addition to affecting the decisions and welfare of consumers and producers of the 
substitute product, the changes in chsp  and 
f
hsp  have a feedback effect on the market for 
the regulated product (recall equations (III.3.1), (III.3.2), and (III.3.7)). In particular, an 
increase (decrease) in chsp  shifts the demand for the regulated product rgD upwards 
(downwards), while an increase (decrease) in fhsp  causes an upward (downward) shift of 
the supply of the regulated product rgS (recall equations (I.8) and (I.18) and Figures I.3 
and I.5). The total effects of the input subsidy on the final consumer market for the 
regulated product under the three scenarios considered here are depicted in Figure 
III.3.11. In all cases, the policy causes an increase in the regulated product supplier 
profits given by ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0.
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Figure III.3.11.  Overall Impact of the Input Subsidy on the rg Product Market  
 
Regarding the impact of the input subsidy on the market for the inputs used in the 
production of the substitute product, no matter the effect of the policy on chsp  and 
f
hsp , 
the introduction of an input subsidy in the market for the regulated product reduces the 
demand for inputs used in the production of its substitute (as the equilibrium quantity of 
the substitute product falls in the presence of the policy). The reduced demand for hs 
inputs results, then, in lower equilibrium input price and quantity (see equations (III.3.6) 
and (III.3.8)), and a reduction in the profits of the supplier of these inputs, with the 
change in profits given by ( ) ( ) 0.I I s I shs hs hs hs hs hs hsw c x w c x        
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III.3.12, panel b graphs the changes in the market for the input used in the production of 
the substitute product due to the introduction of an input subsidy for the regulated 
product. 
 
 
Figure III.3.12.  Total Effect of an Input Subsidy on the Input Markets  
 
Finally, the change in hsw  has a feedback effect on the market of the regulated input. 
Specifically, the decrease in hsw  reduces the demand for the regulated input 
I
rgD  (see 
equation (I.20) and Figure I.6) which, in turn, (a) bolsters the impact of the cost-reducing 
input subsidy on the price of this input, and (b) lessens the impact of the policy on the 
quantity of the subsidized input (see equations (III.3.5) and (III.3.7)). The total effects of 
the input subsidy on the input markets are depicted in Figure III.3.12.  
Overall, the analysis of the system-wide market and welfare impacts of the input 
subsidy indicates that: (a) the qualitative nature of the welfare effects on the consumers 
and producers of the substitute product is scenario-specific and depends on the conditions 
in the market for both the regulated product and the substitute product; (b) the impacts of 
the input subsidy are asymmetric across the different consumers and producers affected 
by the policy; (c) determination of these asymmetric impacts requires a disaggregation of 
the benefits and costs to the level of the individual agent; and (d) in Scenarios I and III, 
some of the consumers (Scenario I) or some of the producers (Scenario III) who find it 
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optimal to switch from the substitute product to the regulated good after the introduction 
of the input subsidy realize welfare losses. 
The asymmetric impact of the policy on the welfare of all relevant interest groups 
is summarized in Table III.3.1, while Figures III.3.13-III.3.15 summarize the system-wide 
market and welfare impacts of this policy under the different scenarios considered in this 
study. For simplicity, the feedback effects described above (Figures III.3.11 and III.3.12) 
are not included in Figures III.3.13-III.3.15.  
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Table III.3.1.  System-Wide Welfare Impacts of an Input Subsidy 
 Consumers 
of ls 
switching    
to rg 
Consumers 
of rg 
Consumers 
of hs 
switching    
to rg 
Consumers 
of hs 
Producers   
of rg 
Producers   
of hs 
switching   
to rg 
Producers   
of hs 
Suppliers   
of rg 
Suppliers   
of hs 
Input 
Suppliers   
rg 
Input 
Suppliers      
hs 
Scenario  
I 
+ + some +  
some – 
– + + + + – + – 
Scenario 
II 
+ + + + + + + + – + – 
Scenario 
III 
+ + + + + some –   
some + 
– + – + – 
+    denotes welfare gains 
–    denotes welfare losses 
 
Condition for Scenario I:
( ) (1 )( )
c f
rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p p w w
 
     

           
  
Condition for Scenario II:
(1 )( ) ( )
( ) (1 )( )
s b
f c fhs hs
rg rg hs rg rg rg hss b
hs hs
p w w p p w w
      
      
   
                     
 
Condition for Scenario III: 
(1 )( ) ( )s bc fhs hs
rg rg rg hsp p w w
     
 
   
        
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Producers 
Input Suppliers 
Figure II.3.13.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of an Input Subsidy under Scenario I    
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Figure II.3.14.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of an Input Subsidy under Scenario II    
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Producers 
Input Suppliers 
Figure II.3.15.  System-Wide Market and Welfare Impacts of an Input Subsidy under Scenario III    
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Disaggregation of Welfare Changes and Comparison with Conventional Analysis 
Before concluding the analysis of this policy, it is important to note that the key findings 
of this section outlined above are important because they indicate that a proper 
accounting of the differential welfare impacts of an input subsidy requires a 
disaggregated analysis, particularly in Scenarios I and III where some of the consumers 
(Scenario I) or some of the producers (Scenario III) of the substitute product realize 
welfare losses after they have optimally switched to the regulated good. While, as was 
pointed out earlier, the aggregate welfare changes can be determined using the 
calculation of producer and consumer surplus from the supply and demand curves, the 
allocation of the welfare changes to the two markets is incorrect.  
Following the same approach developed in the analysis of the reduced 
I
rgc  in 
Section II.4 (as in both cases the changes in the consumer and producer prices of the 
different products are qualitatively the same), it can be shown that, similar to the case of 
reduced 
I
rgc  Scenario I, allocating the cost and benefits according to the demand curves in 
each market overstates the benefits to those that originally consumed the regulated 
product and overstates the costs to those that originally consumed the substitute product 
(i.e., overstates both the gain in the regulated market and the loss in the substitute 
market). In short, the calculation of consumer surplus from the demand curves does not 
provide a proper allocation of the costs and benefits to the various consumer groups. 
While these overstated amounts cancel each other out at the aggregate level, they yield 
incorrect results if they are used to determine the distributional impacts of an input 
subsidy.  
The need to disaggregate the consumer surplus measures is clearly important in 
Scenario I, since in this scenario some consumers gain and others lose from the 
introduction of the input subsidy. However, if it is believed that the magnitude of the gain 
realized by consumers is also important, then disaggregating the gains that occur in 
Scenarios II and III may also be required as the effects of the subsidy were shown to vary 
among consumers. The same conclusions, of course, can be drawn regarding the need to 
disaggregate producer welfare. In this case, there is a clear need to disaggregate producer 
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welfare in Scenario III, since in this case some of the producers that switch to producing 
the regulated good will be worse off than they were originally in producing the substitute 
product. There may also be a need to disaggregate the changes in producer welfare in 
Scenarios I and II, since, as was shown in the previous sections, the welfare changes are 
not symmetric among producers.   
 
 
 
  
- 182 - 
 
 
 
III.4 Additional Considerations, Policy Studies and Empirical 
Implementation  
In addition to enabling the analysis of traditional policy mechanisms like subsidies and 
taxes, our framework can also be utilized to analyze the market and welfare impacts of 
other important (and increasingly relevant) policy mechanisms like food labeling and the 
introduction and change of standards for various products. Such policies are particularly 
significant for marketing systems that, like the industrialized agri-food system, are 
characterized by asymmetric information due to the presence and continuous development 
of credence goods and concepts (like natural, local, sustainable, low carbon footprint, etc.). 
 Examples of labeling policies that have been analyzed using various adaptations 
of our framework include the labeling of GM products (Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; 
Veyssiere and Giannakas, 2006), country-of-origin-labeling (Plastina, Giannakas and 
Pick, 2011), and labeling of nanofoods (Tran, Yiannaka and Giannakas, 2019), while 
examples of studies on regulatory requirements/standards include those on the economic 
effects of purity standards in biotech labeling laws (Giannakas et al., 2011) and 
renewable portfolio standards for conventional electricity (Bhattacharya, Giannakas and 
Schoengold, 2017). In general, labeling policies and standards affect the consumer 
valuation of the regulated product (preference effect, which is similar to the one studied 
in Section II.1), while increasing the segregation and identity preservation costs (cost 
effect, which is the reverse of that studied in Section II.4 and can affect multiple supply 
channels). The system-wide market and welfare effects of these policies are determined, 
then, by the relative magnitude of these preference and cost effects.  
 Regarding the empirical implementation of our theoretical framework, a common 
finding in the previous analyses and results is that the market and welfare impacts of 
different policies (and changes in market conditions) depend on the values of the key 
parameters of our models – the preference, cost and market power parameters. These 
values can be derived from relevant (stated and revealed) consumer preference studies, 
studies on cost structure and producer efficiency, and studies on market power in the 
supply channels of interest. Examples of studies that utilize empirical estimates and 
simulation methods to quantify analytical results of various adaptations of our framework 
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include Giannakas and Kaplan (2005) who study conservation compliance on highly 
erodible lands by heterogeneous producers; Plastina, Giannakas and Pick (2011) who 
analyze the market and welfare impacts of mandatory country-of-origin labeling for 
specialty crops in the U.S.; and Bhattacharya, Giannakas and Schoengold (2017) who 
study the impacts of renewable portfolio standards in the U.S. electricity sector.    
Finally, it is important to note that, in providing a means of determining the 
system-wide economic effects and distributional impacts of changes in market conditions 
and policies, our framework of analysis can provide a valuable theoretical grounding to 
empirical studies of important market and policy issues. Indeed, by explicitly accounting 
for consumer and producer heterogeneity, our framework is uniquely equipped to inform 
behavioral and experimental economic studies that can empirically capture the essence of 
such heterogeneity, while, by identifying the exact conditions under which different 
scenarios will emerge, it can help direct a focus of the empirical research efforts on the 
determination of the relevant scenario at hand. This is particularly important for (ex ante) 
policy design since, as shown in our analysis, the system-wide market and welfare 
impacts of changes in market conditions and policies tend to be case/scenario specific.      
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Summary and Concluding Remarks  
This book presented a novel, integrated, multi-market framework of market and policy 
analysis that explicitly accounts for the empirically relevant heterogeneity in consumer 
preferences or/and incomes; heterogeneous producers; imperfectly competitive input 
suppliers, processors or/and retailers; and links and interactions between the agri-food 
supply channels of interest. The explicit consideration of consumer and producer 
heterogeneity represents a significant departure from the representative consumer and 
producer that have been at the center of most of the literature on market and policy 
analysis, and enables the distributional impacts of changes in market conditions and 
policies to be fully identified.  
Once the general framework of analysis was developed, it was used to analyze 
the system-wide market and welfare impacts of a number of changes in market conditions 
(like changes in consumer preferences, costs and market structure) and policies (like 
subsidies and taxes) on one of the products in the system. Consistent with a priori 
expectations, the use of the framework unveiled impacts masked by the conventional 
market and policy analysis. 
Overall, the analysis of the system-wide economic effects of the changes in 
market conditions and policies indicated that: (a) the qualitative nature of the welfare 
effects on the consumers and producers of the substitute products is case-specific and 
dependent on the conditions in the market for both the reference/regulated product and 
the substitute product; (b) the impacts of these changes in market conditions and policies 
are asymmetric across the different consumers and producers involved; (c) determination 
of these asymmetric impacts requires a disaggregation of the benefits and costs to the 
level of the individual agent; and (d) the conventional analysis fails to provide a proper 
allocation of the costs and benefits of these changes in market conditions and policies to 
the various consumer and producer groups involved. 
In particular, the analysis revealed that allocating the costs and benefits according 
to the demand and supply curves in each market overstates the gains and losses in the 
markets for the reference/regulated product and its substitute. While these overstated 
amounts cancel each other out at the aggregate level, they yield incorrect results if they 
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are used to determine the distributional impacts of changes in market conditions and 
policies.  
Thus, in addition to enhancing the empirical relevance of market and policy 
analysis by allowing the research to account for key elements of the increasingly 
industrialized agri-food system, the explicit consideration of consumer and producer 
heterogeneity enables the analysis to disaggregate these interest groups and correctly 
identify the effects of different market changes and policies on different consumers and 
producers. This is important as better measures (and understanding) of the economic 
impacts of changes in market conditions and policies can lead to improved policy design, 
enhanced efficiency, increased effectiveness, and reduced policy failures. 
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